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The Islamic Rule of Lenity:
Judicial Discretion and Legal
Canons
IntisarA. Rabb*
ABSTRACT

This Article explores an area of close parallelbetween legal
doctrines in the contexts of Islamic law and American legal
theory. In criminal law, both traditionsespouse a type of "ruleof
lenity" that curious common law rule that instructsjudges not
to impose criminal sanctions in cases of doubt. The rule is
curious because criminal law is a peremptory expression of
legislative will. However, the rule of lenity would seem to
encourage courts to disregard one of the most fundamental
principles of Islamic and American legislation and
adjudication:judicial deference to legislative supremacy. In the
Islamic context, such a rule would be even more curious,
allowing Muslim judges to disregard a deference rule even more
entrenched than the American one: a divine legislative
supremacy to which judicial deference should be absolute. Yet,
there is an "Islamic rule of lenity" that pervades Islamic
criminal law. This Article examines the operation of and
justifications for the lenity rule in the American and Islamic
contexts against the backdrop of theories of law and legislative
supremacy that underlie both. In both contexts, the lenity rule
acts serves to expand the operation of judicial discretion. But
whereas the use of American lenity is fraught and limited,
Islamic lenity is relatively uncontroversialand expansive. With
the Islamic rule of lenity, we see both stronger legislative
supremacy doctrines and more assertions (albeit hidden) of
judicial authority to legislate. An examination of the role of
lenity in Islamic law with respect to American law explains
differences in the scope and exercise of judicial discretion in
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each legal system. It can also lead us to reconsider common
public law theories that characterize rules of deference to
doctrines of legislative supremacy and nondelegation as a
constraint on judicial discretion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With new questions surrounding Islamic law in American and
global contexts comes an urgent need to understand sharf'a,
particularly Islamic criminal law, where the stakes are high and its
landscape appears ruggedly harsh. In foreign constitutional contexts,
Islamic law has reemerged globally with over twenty-six countries
adopting constitutions with a clause declaring Islamic law to be a
source of state law.' Issues of Islamic law-in particular,

punishments for adultery, apostasy, and blasphemy-frequently
appear in U.S. newspapers with important implications for American
and international law and policy. Such issues have even found a way
into American electoral politics, as presidential candidates speak
against the "threat of a sharf'a-takeover" of American courts,2 and
several state legislatures have considered bills seeking to "ban
sharf'a."3
For an insightful view, placing the phenomenon in comparative context, see
1.
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARD JURISTOcRAcY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2004) (describing the rise of constitutional drafting and reform
in over eighty countries, including many in the Muslim world, giving rise to rising
judicial power over definitions of law). The constitutional status of Islamic law is an
issue of pending debate in Libya, Tunisia, and elsewhere in the aftermath of the 2011
Arab Spring.
As early as the Summer of 2010, then-presidential hopeful Newt Gingrich
2.
called for a national debate on sharraand a federal law prohibiting its citation. Newt
Gingrich, America at Risk: Camus, National Security and Afghanistan, Keynote
Address to American Enterprise Institute 7-8 (July 29, 2010), available at
http://www.aei.org/video/101267.
3.
One state passed a constitutional amendment, Oklahoma State Question
755, by a 70 percent majority in a November 2010 referendum, prohibiting the citation
of sharfa and foreign law. U.S. District Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange issued a
preliminary injunction blocking the new law after a challenge by a Muslim plaintiff on
First Amendment grounds, and the case is currently on appeal before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1307-08 (W.D.
Okla. 2010) (issuing preliminary injunction upon finding "that the weighing of the
harms involved in this case clearly would favor protecting plaintiffs FirstAmendment
rights over the will of the voters."), appeal docketed, No. 10-6273 (10th Cir. argued
Sept. 12, 2011). Three states have passed bills that would prohibit the citation and/or
practice of any form of sharfa. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2011) (S.B. 460 (La.
2010)); H.B. 785 (La. 2010), adopted as Act No. 886 (passed June 29, 2010, effective
Aug. 15, 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-103 (2011) (May 27, 2010); see also S.B. 510,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011) (pending legislative action). Almost two dozen states have
proposed legislation or constitutional amendments to the same effect, including
Oklahoma in the wake of challenges to its proposed constitutional amendment. S.B. 62
(Ala. 2011) (constitutional amendment); H.B. 88, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Alaska
2011) (constitutional amendment, introduced Jan. 11, 2011); S.C.R. 1010, 50th Leg.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011) (introduced Jan. 14, 2011); H.C.R. 2033 (Ariz. 2011) (same);
S.B. 97, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2011) (introduced Jan. 20, 2011, amended
Feb. 1, 2011); S.J.R. 10 (Ark. 2011) (constitutional amendment); H.B. 45, 151st Gen.
Assemb., 2011-2012 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011) (introduced Jan. 24, 2011); S.B. 51 (Ga.
2011); H.C.R. 44 (Idaho 2010) (filed Feb. 17, 2010, adopted Mar. 29, 2010) (non-binding
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In earlier American legal history, judicial depictions of Islamic
law have featured a system rife with either caprice or cruelty. In
terms of caprice, U.S. Supreme Court portraits have typically
followed from the famous account of Max Weber, 4 describing a
traditional qddr (judge) under a tree, whimsically dispensing justice.5
As for cruelty, another common view imagines Islamic law to be a
religious code that adherents perceive as descended from on high,
expressing the will of an angry and intolerant God intent on
amputating hands and executing apostates.6 In the first picture, the
law is wholly unknown outside of the qddVs own mind, and in the
second, it is crystal clear and relentlessly harsh.
Existing scholarship in comparative law and public law theory
typically offers no better way to understand the legal interpretative
process in Islamic law than the seductively simple depictions of the
Weberian qda4/ or his draconian counterpart. The critical insight

resolution); S.J.R. 16, 117th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011) (constitutional
amendment, introduced Jan. 18, 2011); H.B. 1078 (Ind. 2011); S.B. 520 (Ind. 2011);
H.F. 489 (Iowa 2011); H.F. 575 (Iowa 2011); H.J.R. 14 (Iowa 2011) (constitutional
amendment); H.B. 2087, 84th Leg., 2011 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2011) (introduced Jan. 31,
2011); H.B. 301 (Miss. 2011); H.J.R. 31, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2011)
(constitutional amendment, introduced Feb. 24, 2011); S.B. 308 (Mo. 2011); H.B. 708
(Mo. 2011); H.B. 768 (Mo. 2011); L.B. 647, 102nd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Neb. 2011)
(introduced Jan. 19, 2011); A.B. 3496, § 3.b, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2010); H.B. 1552, 53rd
Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2011) (introduced Feb. 7, 2011); H.J.R. 1056 (Okla. 2011)
(constitutional amendment); H. 3490, S.C. Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011)
(introduced Jan. 27, 2011); S. 444 (S.C. 2011); S.B. 201 (S.D. 2011); H.B. 911, 82d Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (introduced Jan. 26, 2011); H.B. 3027 (Tex. 2011); H.J.R. 8, 61st
Leg., 2011 Gen. Sess., (Wyo. 2011) (constitutional amendment, introduced Jan. 19,
2011). And three similar measures have failed to pass. S.B. 1962, 112th Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2010) (introduced Mar. 2, 2010; failed Apr. 30, 2010); S.B. 1294 (Fla. 2011); H.B. 1273
(Fla. 2011); H.B. 301, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2011) (introduced Jan. 4, 2011; failed Feb.
1, 2011); Utah H.B. 296 1st Sub. (Utah 2010) (introduced 2010; withdrawn Feb. 2011);
cf. Aaron Fellmeth, InternationalLaw and Foreign Laws in the US. State Legislatures,
15 ASIL INSIGHTS (May 26, 2011), http://www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight110526.pdf
(discussing cases and legislation); Carlos M. Vasquez, Customary InternationalLaw as
U.S. Law: A Critiqueof the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the
Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 102-03 nn.1-4 (2011) (discussing
implications of state legislation "exclu[ding] Sharia law" and other foreign laws as a
method of state regulation of international law).
4.
See MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 895, 976 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968) (1922)
("Kadi-justice (Urteilsgrunde)knows no rational 'rules of decision' whatsoever . . . .").
5.
See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to
considerations of individual expediency."). For additional citations of "qddl justice" as
arbitrary decision-making in state and federal court opinions, see Asifa Quraishi, On
Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi Helps Me Understand American
Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 339, 339 nn.1-2 (collecting cases).
6.
For early American judicial views of Islamic law in federal courts, see the
survey by Marie Failinger, Islam in the Mind of American Courts: 1800-1960, B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. (forthcoming 2012) ("American judges' references to Islam display
little evidence of familiarity with Islamic law or the Muslim faith.").
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missing is an account that reveals the workings of Islamic law as it
functioned historically, especially in the high-stakes field of criminal
law.7 Focusing on that arena, it is worth directing attention to the
underappreciated area of legal canons like lenity, which turn out to
be central to interpretive processes in both Islamic and Americancommon law legal systems and to closely reflect the public law
structural considerations in each. Historically, through the use of
certain legal canons-judge-made principles of legal interpretation
common to many legal traditions-Muslim jurists developed a highly
sophisticated and internally regulated method for adjusting sharf'a to
changing social contexts in a way that reflected the politico-legal
institutional architecture and core substantive values of their
societies and times. The medieval Muslim jurists' process of
appealing to these legal canons was comparable, I argue, to analogous
phenomena at common law. The aim of this Article is to provide a
historical and comparative account of the legal and social logic of
interpretation of criminal law in American and Islamic contexts. This
account of legal processes in criminal law can usefully inform our
understanding of the judicial power and separation of powers
concerns in comparative public law theory.
For this purpose, I trace the function of a criminal law canon
akin to the common law "rule of lenity," a principle of narrow
construction for ambiguous penal statutes.8 The American rule
directs judges not to impose criminal sanctions whenever they have
doubts about the applicability of the law to a set of facts at hand.9 In
early Islamic contexts, judges invoked a similar principle, the "hudad
maxim," which also directs courts not to apply Islam's fixed criminal
sanctions (hudad)in cases of doubt.10 Examined together, it becomes
clear that judges deployed legal canons to translate "legislation" to
7.
For definitions and the significance of notions of cruelty regarding punitive
practices in criminal law, see Paulo Barrozo, Punishing Cruelly: Punishment, Cruelty,
Mercy, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 67 (2008).
8.
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) ("The rule
that penal laws are to be construed strictly is perhaps not much less old than
construction itself.").
9.
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY app. B, at 23 (3d ed. 2001) (defining the rule of lenity as
the legal maxim "against applying punitive sanctions if there is ambiguity as to
underlying criminal liability or criminal penalty").
10.
I use "courts" to refer to the body of jurists that claims authority to "say
what the law is." This refers to the judicial power of Article III courts in the American
context. See U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177 (1803) (defining the constitutional scope of the American judiciary). There is a
similar concept of judicial power in the classical Islamic legal context. See CHIBLI
MALLAT, THE RENEWAL OF ISLAMIC LAW 79 (1993) (applying the Marbury phrase,
defining the judges charge to "say what the law is," to jurists in the Islamic context).
For further discussion of juristic authority and process, see Intisar A. Rabb, We the
Jurists":Islamic Constitutionalismin Iraq, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 527, 542-47 (2008).
In this sense, I use courts and (American) judges or (Muslim) jurists interchangeably.
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on-the-ground decisions in both contexts, and that canons played
similar roles to differing effects in the theory and applications of law
in each tradition.
For comparative purposes, a central aim has been to investigate
the role canons play in legal interpretative processes and what that
reflects about the scope of adjudicative choice and judicial power in
regimes that have strong notions of legislative supremacy. The
historical and judicial records provide evidence that canons like lenity
often reflect not only constitutional structural norms, but also core
values in each system." The point is not to suggest any perfect
parallel or agreement on the content of the public values expressed by
these constitutional texts, but to indicate how judges deploy legal
canons like lenity to uphold core values of their respective legal
systems. While there are certainly notable divergences between the
modern Anglo-American common law contexts and the premodern
Islamic one, the sources show a surprising degree of overlap in
applications of lenity within the confines of the ideals of legislative
supremacy and other constitutional commitments. This insight can
provide a useful starting point for further studies as to how American
legal scholars might better understand how separation of powers
concerns relate to constitutional and statutory interpretation
decisions.
My argument proceeds in three parts. Part II lays out the typical
justifications for the American rule of lenity as a principle of
constitutional structure. Once a doctrine of judicial discretion,
prominent American scholars and jurists have come to view lenity as
the "new nondelegation doctrine,"--one embodiment of the principle
cautioning courts to defer to legislative supremacy. While other
justifications exist, this structural view of lenity has become
dominant amongst the most ardent proponents of lenity both in the
courtroom and in the classroom. Part III turns to explore structural
aspects of classical Islamic law that often produce an even higher
premium on legislative supremacy for the criminal law than the
American context. Part IV queries how the hudi2d maxim (the
"Islamic rule of lenity") operated against that structural backdrop. It
contrasts structural arguments with equitable ones to show ways in
which the maxim largely reflected the substantive moral
commitments of the Islamic legal system as Muslim jurists
understood them to exist in Islam's fundamental or "constitutional"
legal texts. Muslim jurists' lenity jurisprudence displays their

The case has already been made for the American system. See William N.
11.
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1091
(1989) (observing that American legal maxims reflect "public values" drawn from the
Constitution, federal statutes and, common law); Cass Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 505 (1989) (defending legal canons as
representative of public values).
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emphasis on ideals of equity and fairness above rigid definitions of
legislative supremacy, though-to be sure-there were limits to how
far they would emphasize equitable above textual principles when
they saw a threat to sensitive social or moral values. Appeals to
equity and fairness through lenity principles reveal the extent to
which judges in each system understand the extent of adjudicative
choice with respect to distinctive structural features and value
commitments.
II. AMERICAN LENITY AS A RULE OF STRUCTURE

The rule of lenity has become the latest, greatest expression of
the dual doctrine of legislative supremacy and nondelegation-the
latter being the American rule that legislatures are to make the law
without delegating that task to any other branch. These doctrines
carry particular weight in criminal law. Recognition of the high
stakes of criminal punishment-among them, the potential loss of
life, liberty, or wealth-have long undergirded the importance of
allowing the legislature, as a democratically elected body, to make
criminal law. 12 In this sense, one view of American lenity is that it
vindicates structural concerns of the U.S. Constitution, designed to
maintain a clear separation between legislative and judicial powers.
Following that line of thought, we might-as some scholars have
posited-think lenity to be a uniquely American phenomenon, best
described as an American principle born of our constitutional
structure. While that would be a narrow view of lenity, a structuralist
view of the doctrine is worth exploring, as it drives the interpretative
scheme of lenity proponents and provides in exploring the lenity
analog in the Islamic context-where structural concerns are similar
(if more exaggerated). Before turning to situate the Islamic context
against this one, we explore the American structural arguments for
lenity as a rule of legislative supremacy and nondelegation.

12.
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) ("Because of the
seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents
the moral condemnation of the community . .. legislatures and not courts should define
criminal activity.').
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A. Lenity as Nondelegation1

Article 1, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution declares that, "All
legislative power herein shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States."14 The conventional understanding of this clause formed a
robust nondelegation doctrine: Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to any other branch,' 5 particularly in matters of
criminal law.16 But the realities of statutory interpretation and
adjudication prevented the Court from taking this declaration too
literally.' 7 Attempts to apply the doctrine 8 continually failed,' 9 and
as a result, this version of the nondelegation doctrine has enjoyed but
"one good year," when it served to check the expansive New Deal
activities under President Franklin D. Roosevelt.2 0 Since, the Court

13.
For especially useful historical treatments of the nondelegation doctrine
beyond the sketch most relevant to the lenity discussion presented here, see Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the
Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1402 (2000) (arguing that the "new
delegation doctrine . .. asks how . . . the law is being made" rather than "who ought to

make law"); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional,98 MIcH. L. REV.
303, 330-35 (1999) (outlining the "old nondelegation doctrine"). See generally DAVID
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION 3 (1993) (arguing against broad Congressional delegation).
14.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) ("[W~e long have
15.
insisted that the 'integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by
the Constitution' mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative
power to another Branch." (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692
(1892))).
See Bass, 404 U.S. at 349 (refusing "to assume that Congress has meant to
16.
effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction"); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)
(barring federal common law crimes in deference to "the legislative authority of the
Union").
See, e.g., Cargo of the Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 387-88 (1813)
17.
(recognizing the nondelegation principle but upholding a disputed statute because it
issued from Congress rather than the President and did not grant him unguided
authority); see also Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994
SUP. CT. REV. 345, 347 (arguing that despite the theory of nondelegation, in practice,
there is an unspoken rule that Congress may delegate criminal lawmaking authority to
the courts).
18.
See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)
(outlining an "intelligible principle[s]" test to determine whether Congress had
provided sufficient guidance and limits to "the person or body authorized" to carry out
the terms of a statute to effect a permissible delegation of its legislative powers).
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (remarking
19.
on the problems of judicial enforcement of the conventional doctrine and its intelligible
principles test); see also Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L.
REV. 323, 324-28 (1987) (noting the "absence of judicially manageable and enforceable
criteria to distinguish permissible from impermissible delegations").
20.
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322
(2000); Sunstein, supra note 13, at 330. The Court invoked the doctrine for the first and
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has declined to invoke the old nondelegation doctrine, 2' even when it
had plausible cause to do so. 22 The doctrine's continued dormancy
prompted notable scholars to pronounce the nondelegation doctrine
dead. 23
Professor Cass Sunstein, however, has convincingly argued that
the doctrine lives on, "relocated rather than abandoned."2 4 It shifted,
he argues, to a series of smaller nondelegation doctrines that appear
in the form of canons of statutory interpretation. 25 Indeed, as the
Supreme Court noted in Mistretta v. United States: "In recent years,
our application of the nondelegation doctrine principally has been

last time in 1935 to invalidate two congressional statutes, most notably in the
Schechter Poultry case. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 542 (1935) ("We think that the code-making power conferred is an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power."); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
430 (1935) (holding that the National Investment Recovery Act "goes beyond" the
"limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend"). For
discussion of nondelegation cases before and after 1935, see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (collecting post-New Deal nondelegation cases); J W Hampton,
Jr. & Co., 276 U.S. at 406-07 (collecting pre-New Deal nondelegation cases).
21.
A possible exception arose a decade ago, when the old doctrine appeared in
response to the appellate decision Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027,
1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (striking down a provision of the Clean Air Act that was bounded
by no intelligible principle for informing EPA standards to determine when public
health concern with respect to ozone levels were reasonable), rev'd, Am. Trucking
Ass'as, 531 U.S. at 472. The Supreme Court overturned the D.C. Circuit decision, with
a restatement of the older doctrine: "In a delegation challenge, the constitutional
question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency" whereas
Article 1, Section 1 "permits no delegation of those powers." Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531
U.S. at 472. But it affirmed the delegation in this case upon determining that the EPA
standards sufficed as the "intelligible principles" to guide agency discretion. Id. at 474.
That is, the Court upheld congressional delegations even when the
22.
"intelligent principle" arguably was lacking. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("I can find no place in our constitutional system for an agency created
by Congress to exercise no governmental power other than the making of laws.");
United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (upholding the
Communication Act's delegation of authority to the FCC to regulate cable television to
the extent it was "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's
various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting"); Lichter v. United
States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-86 (1948) (upholding Renegotiation Act's delegation to the
War Department to recover "excessive profits" on war contracts even though "excessive
profits" was not defined by Congress until a later amendment); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 426-27 (1944) (upholding the Emergency Price Control Act's grant of
authority to Price Administrator to fix "fair and equitable" commodities prices).
23.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICAL
REVIEW 132-33 (1980).
24.
Sunstein, supra note 20, at 315-16.
25.
Id. But see David Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the
(2002)
1, 23-24
New Nondelegation Doctrine, 64 U. PITT. L. REV.
("Notwithstanding ... evidence that the nondelegation doctrine has played little or no
role in the Supreme Court's construction of statutes, Cass Sunstein argues that the
doctrine is "alive and well" in the realm of statutory
nondelegation
construction.... [T]hese canons do not implement a nondelegation doctrine." (citations
omitted)).
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limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more
particularly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations
that otherwise might be thought to be unconstitutional." 26
Accordingly, to grasp the nature of the new nondelegation doctrine
and the scope of legislative supremacy, we must look not to the
Constitution's separation of powers clauses, but to interpretive canons
or legal maxims.
The "new nondelegation doctrine" applied broadly, but stopped
short when it came to criminal law. The oft-cited Chevron case
required courts to defer to agency interpretations of statutes within
their scope of authority, 2 7 but not so with agencies related to criminal
law. Allowing the Department of Justice to guide adjudication would
be the exemplar of the administrative fox guarding the henhousenotwithstanding at least one proposal to the contrary. 28 If Chevron
deference can be labeled the "quintessential prodelegation canon,"2 9
then lenity can be dubbed the quintessential nondelegation canon. As
a quasi-constitutional doctrine, it vindicates the idea of legislative
supremacy much more than the full nondelegation doctrine ever did.
B. Lenity as a Uniquely American Rule of Structure?
It seems only natural that those committed to a structural view
of our constitutional commitments would enthusiastically promote
the rule of lenity within the family of nondelegation canons.30 For

26.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373 n.7; see also Int'l Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d
1310, 1316 (1991) (noting the Court's "general practice of applying the nondelegation
doctrine mainly in the form of 'giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations
that might otherwise be thought to be unconstitutional' (citing Indus. Union Dept.,
AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980))).
27.
Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). Chevron is the single-most cited case in court opinions, and inspired an
enormous body of academic commentary. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823, 823 (2006) (noting that Chevron is "the most cited case in modern public
law"). For an exhaustive study, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren Baer, The
Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations
from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1085 (2008) (surveying all 1014 Supreme
Court cases between Chevron in 1983 and Hamdan in 2006).
See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110
28.
HARv. L. REV. 469, 490-91 (1996) (acknowledging but arguing against the practice of
not extending Chevron deference to Department of Justice interpretations of federal
criminal laws).
Sunstein, supra note 20, at 329 (emphasis added).
29.
Sunstein notes lenity as just one of a family of such canons. See id. at 33030.
35 (listing the "nondelegation canons" that trump even the strong pull of Chevron
deference to agency constructions of statutes that raise constitutional doubts, preempt
state law, or infringe on the sovereignty of Native Americans). For a fuller exposition of
lenity as a structural rule, see Zacchary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of
Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 886 (2004) (emphasizing the nondelegation, or
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example, Justice Scalia, who maintains that constitutional "structure
is everything,"3 ' is also the Supreme Court's'primary proponent of the
rule of lenity.32 His support seems unlikely at first blush. Because
lenity applications often shield defendants from harsh punishment, it
gives the impression of being pro-defendant, anti-textualist, and
contra-legislative will; it also seems to provide a direct safeguard for
individual rights through constraining judges from entering
convictions in cases of doubt. Indeed, the Court and other
commentators have understood the rule to be doing just that. 33
Not so for Justice Scalia. For him, the rule makes sense precisely
because it calls on judges to defer not to slippery notions of
substantive rights, but to the express will of Congress. That is,
Justice Scalia does not embrace lenity out of any "sentimental
consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress
in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct." 34 Rather, he understands

legislative supremacy, rationale for the rule of lenity); Note, Justifying the Chevron
Doctrine: Insights from the Rule of Lenity, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2043, 2055-59 (2010)
(detailing the legislative supremacy rationale).
31.
Antonin Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional
Interpretation, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1417, 1417-18 (2008) ("In the days when I
taught constitutional law . .. [there were] two constitutional courses. One was entitled
Individual Rights and Liberties, and focused primarily upon guarantees of the Bill of
Rights. The other (I forget the title of it) focused upon the structural provisions of the
Constitution, principally the separation of powers and federalism. That was the course
I taught-and I used to refer to it as real constitutional law. The distinctive function of
a constitution, after all, is to constitute the political organs, the governing structure of
a state. . . . Structure is everything.").
32.
Kahan, supra note 17, at 348, 390-96 (discussing Justice Scalia's
aggressive defense of lenity); Sarah Newland, Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory
Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 197, 205 (1994)
("Justice Scalia is one of the strongest supporters of lenity . . . .").
33.
See, e.g., United States v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 380 U.S. 157, 160 (1965) (strictly
construing a statute to protect property rights in light of lenity); Callanan v. United
States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) (noting that several times, "the rule of lenity was
utilized in favorem libertatis,to resolve the ambiguity" (citing Ladner v. United States,
358 U.S. 169 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955); United States v.
Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952))); Bonetti v. Rogers, 356 U.S. 691,
699 (1958) (applying the rule of lenity in defense of the right to travel: "We cannot
'assume that Congress meant to trench on [an alien's] freedom beyond that which is
required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used."' (citations
omitted)); Bos. & Me. R.R., 380 U.S. 157 (applying lenity to protect property rights); cf.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandingsof 'JudicialPower'in
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 992 (2001) ("In my view,
Article III judges interpreting statutes are both agents carrying out directives laid
down by the legislature and partners in the enterprise of law elaboration, for they (like
the legislature) are ultimately agents of 'We the People."').
34.
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an
undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this is not out
of any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress
in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of
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our constitutional structure to require courts to apply lenity in cases
of doubt out of paramount concern with legislative supremacy in an
area of law that happens to have due process implications as well. In
his words, the separation of powers framework permits "legislatures
and not courts [to] define criminal activity."35 Due process
considerations for criminal law further dictate that, because only
legislatures should define punishable conduct, they should state "in a
language that the common world will understand, [] what the law
intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so
far as possible the line should be clear."36 Lenity for Justice Scalia, in
principal measure, gives voice to the otherwise weakened
nondelegation doctrine in the important area of criminal law. Any
benefits that accrue to the defendant are collateral and derivative of
the constitutional structure.3 7
C. American Exceptionalism in Lenity
Joining Justice Scalia, leading scholars of legislation and
constitutional law have argued that lenity is so tied to a uniquely
American constitutional structure that the only way to understand it
is through the lens of structural considerations that reveal the proper
extent of judicial discretion. For example, Professor John Manning
maintains that the structural assumptions underlying the U.S.
Constitution uniquely and radically constrain judicial discretion.3 8
Taking the "judicial power" in Article III as a starting point, he
rejects the notion that American law encompasses the old English
common law idea of the "equity of the statute"3 9-the well-known
our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a
harsher punishment." (quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955))).
35.
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
36.
Id.; see also Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 131 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (explaining lenity as "the venerable principle that 'before a man can be
punished as a criminal under the federal law his case must be plainly and
unmistakably within the provisions of some statute."' (quoting United States v.
Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917))); Arnold v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 104
(1815) (syllabus) ("To enforce any positive rule as a law, before the individual could be
presumed to know it, would be alike inconsistent with public justice and civil
right... . In relation to positive law, that principle implies the necessity of its being
made known before it can impose any obligation. Positive law is a manifestation of the
legislative will; and although there may be a legislative will, it does not become a law,
where it is not manifested.").
37.
Antonin Scalia, supra note 31, at 1418 (noting that individual rights and
liberties are derivative to structure, without which the system cannot "safeguard
individual liberty"). Indeed, scholars have long argued that lenity enjoys "quasiconstitutional" status, in view of its link to the nondelegation doctrine concerned with
the separation of powers articles. See Kahan, supra note 17, at 346.
38.
John Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 56 (2001).
39.
Id. at 57.
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practice of English judges in the eighteenth century and before40 to
diverge from the text of the statute for equitable reasons.4 1
At common law, lenity was an equity principle used to wide
effect in both substantive and evidentiary contexts. 42 The rule
emerged in seventeenth and eighteenth century England at a time
when statutes imposed the death penalty for a wide range of
offenses-from severe crimes, like murder, to minor misdemeanors,
like petty theft.4 3 The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy ostensibly
barred judges from diverging from those statutes. 44 At the same time,
judges and juries faced increased pressure to convict, even where the
sentences seemed excessively harsh. This created a moral dilemma.45
How could courts impose the harsh criminal sanctions in cases where
they entertained doubt as to criminal culpability or deemed the
46
sanctions wildly disproportionate to the crime?

40.
Id. at 27-56 (tracing the origins of equity to Aristotelian notions that
"equity should mitigate the defects of generally worded laws," and noting its
application by English courts possibly as early as the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries).
Id. at 22 (defining "equity of the statute" as a "doctrine authoriz[ing] courts
41.
to extend a clear statute to reach omitted cases that fell within its ration or purpose,
and conversely, to imply exceptions to such a statute when the text would inflict harsh
results that did not serve the statutory purpose").
The history of lenity is elaborated at length elsewhere. For lenity
42.
jurisprudence in the English common law, see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS OF
REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL (2008) (discussing

the emergence of the reasonable doubt doctrine as a version of lenity in England and
Continental

Europe) and JOHN H.

LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY

CRIMINAL TRIAL 334-36 (A. W. Brian Simpson ed., 2003) (detailing the methods by
which court officials in England avoided prosecuting criminals as a precursor to the
formalized rule of lenity).
43.

See

LEON

RADZINOWICz,

1

A

HISTORY

OF

ENGLISH

LAW

AND

ITS

ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 3-4 (1948) (detailing the growing number of crimes
punishable by death in eighteenth century England); ROBERT B. SHOEMAKER,
PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT: PETTY CRIME AND THE LAW IN LONDON AND RURAL
MIDDLESEX, C. 1660-1725 (Anthony Fletcher et al. eds., 2008).
44.
See, e.g., ALBERT DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE

CONSTITUTION 60 (1885) (outlining the interaction of English courts and the legislative
sovereignty of Parliament).
A "moral discomfort" arose time and again, particularly after the Church
45.
abolished the ordeals in 1215, making judges and eventually juries responsible for
making determinations of guilt and innocence for which they believed themselves to be
accountable before God. See WHITMAN, supra note 42, at 97-124, 129-57, 192-99
(explaining a long history of moral dilemmas facing both judges and juries in early
American and Continental European criminal law).
See LANGBEIN, supra note 42, at 334-36 (noting the growing aversion to
46.
capital punishment in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century England because of
the disproportionality between criminal violations and capital punishment and because
of the "truth-defeating" techniques of adversary procedure). On the resulting abolition
of the death penalty, see generally BRIAN P. BLOCK & JOHN HOSTETTLER, HANGING IN
THE BALANCE: A HISTORY OF THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN BRITAIN (1997)
and JAMES WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
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Accordingly, judges devised strategies to avoid findings of guilt
in all but the most egregious instances of criminal offenses. 4 7 For
example, they expanded the scope of the old "benefit of the clergy"
doctrine, which originally exempted members of the Church from the
criminal jurisdiction of secular courts and placed them in the more
lenient ecclesiastical courts. The benefit became a general rule that
allowed first-time offenders to receive more lenient sentences. 48 And
They consistently "down-charged" crimes or "downgraded" the value
of stolen goods to arrive at a milder sentence than the statute
otherwise required. 4 9 And eventually, they devised the formal notion
of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof, barring criminal
convictions where the evidence caused significant uncertainty about
culpability.50 Taken together, the lasting judicial iteration of these
schemes became the common law rule of lenity: equitable principles
of narrowing construction and reasonable doubt that were regular
judicial practice by the early eighteenth century. 5 '

47.
JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY 92 (1935) (noting that judges used
to "invent technicalities in order to avoid infliction of the capital penalty").
48.
See LEONA C. GABEL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER
MIDDLE AGES (1929) (noting that the benefit was widely available at the end of the
thirteenth century to religious "clerks" and extended in the fourteenth century to cover
anyone who could read); PETER BENSON MAXWELL, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF
STATUTES 243 (1875) (discussing the "benefit of the clergy"); see also J. H. BAKER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 513-15 (4th ed. 2002); J. M. BEATTIE,
CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800, at 141-45 (1986) (giving examples of
the benefit of the clergy); John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal
Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 36-41 (1983) (same). The
broad extension of the benefit in the seventeenth century and afterward led some
commentators to conclude that rules of strict construction applied indiscriminately.
E.g., Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of PenalStatutes, 48 HARv. L. REV.
748, 751 (1935) (noting that the courts' use of "extreme technicality" to find ambiguity
that would trigger strict construction was "unrestrained"); Kahan, supra note 17, at
358 (calling the resulting construction from applying the benefit of clergy not just
"narrow[ ]," but "in many cases, fantastic[ ]").
49.
Langbein, supra note 48, at 21-22 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 239) (detailing the methods by which court officials avoided
prosecuting criminals, including down-charging or down-valuing goods in theft cases);
RADZINOWICZ, supra note 43, at 83-106 (discussing the methods courts used to impose
a lesser sentence).
WHITMAN, supra note 42, at 192-99.
50.
51.
There is debate about when lenity became prevalent, but agreement that it
was in full force by the eighteenth century. See Hall, supra note 48, at 750 nn.12-13
(tracing the consistent use of the rule of lenity back to mid-seventeenth-century
England); RADZINOWICZ, supra note 43, at 83 (describing both an increase in legislative
preference for capital punishment and decrease in public preference for harsh
punishment during the eighteenth century); LANGBEIN, supra note 42, at 334 (noting
that the rule predated eighteenth-century England but did not become prevalent until
then); WHITMAN, supra note 42, at 186-200. But see Philip M. Spector, The Sentencing
Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 521 (2002) ("[W]hat we understand to be the
rule of lenity-the rule that substantive criminal statutes should be interpreted
narrowly-itself has no early British counterpart. . . . [Tihe substantive rule of lenity is
an American creation, forged in the furnace of American constitutionalism.").
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According to Manning, equitable constructions like this
expansive sort of lenity never really got off the ground on American
shores because of a new constitutional structure that made legislative
supremacy absolute.5 2 The Framers meant for the Constitution's
separation of powers scheme to constrain the judicial discretion
rampant in eighteenth century England.5 3 Moreover, he argues, early
American understandings of the judicial power probably meant that
equitable readings mirroring English lenity were unpopular in favor
of more "faithful" enforcement of the statutory texts. 54
Spector concurs in the view that American law fundamentally
transformed the English rule of lenity. 55 Though he doubts that
English lenity was as broad as Manning and others suggest, he too
concludes that American lenity is a wholly new version of the rule
tied to the American constitutional structure.5 6 For him, the rule that
appeared in English courts had nothing to do with narrow or
equitable construction of statutes themselves. There, it was only an
evidentiary rule equivalent to "judicial nullification of exceedingly
harsh punishments."5 7 Thus it was an equitable rule of mercy that
applied to sentencing, having nothing to do with American structure
and rules for interpreting texts.
Once the rule reached American shores, in Spector's narrative, it
was folded into a new constitutional structure that constrained the
equitable powers of the courts.5 8 Echoing Manning, Spector
maintains that the rule came to serve "two fundamental (but largely
proceduralor structural)facets of American constitutionalism, rather
than the substantive ends of mercy and substantive justice."59 The
first constitutional facet is the separation of powers-which supports
the nondelegation rationale for lenity.60 The second is due process of
law, the collateral benefit of structure at which Justice Scalia

Manning, supranote 38, at 57-58.
52.
See id. at 37-46 (noting that England lacked a strong system of separated
53.
powers); see also id. at 57-102 (arguing that the U.S. Constitution instituted a robust
model of separated powers designed to limit judicial discretion rather than continue to
allow the "flexibility implicit in a more discretionary [English] approach to statutory
interpretation").
See id. at 57 ("[Tlhe original understanding [of the Judicial Power]
54.
indicates that, in contrast with relevant English practice, the U.S. Constitution selfconsciously separated the judicial from the legislative power and, in doing so, sought to
differentiate sharply the functions performed by these two distinct branches.").
Spector, supra note 51, at 522.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 523.
57.
Id. at 522-24.
58.
Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
59.
Id. at 522.
60.
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gestured as well. 61 No longer could mercy play a role in
determinations of guilt, however harsh the associated punishment
might be. No longer could courts diverge from clear statutory text
through judicial nullifying strategies, however disproportionate the
legislated punishment. Instead courts were to faithfully apply the
text of a clear statute. Only where the text was ambiguous could the
courts narrowly construe its substantive provisions in recognition of
their scaled back scope of discretion and in keeping with the ideals of
legislative supremacy and nondelegation. 62 All of this, Spector
concludes, resulted in a uniquely American form of lenity. "[T]he rule
of the lenity, as we understand it today," he says, "appears to have
been a distinctively American creation, driven by distinctively

American concerns ... [and] forged in the furnace of American
constitutionalism. 63

The accounts differ in the details, but Manning and Spectoralong with Justice Scalia-agree that the nondelegation doctrine
drives a uniquely American rule of lenity. They aim to explicate the
Judicial Power through distinguishing between the old English
common law and the American law approaches to lenity and equity.
For them, whereas the old English system authorized broad
discretion (and hence lenity on the basis of equitable considerations),
the American structure ' forbids it, promoting strong legislative
supremacy instead. Manning's and Spector's arguments have another
effect as well: they lead to the conclusion that American structure is
exceptional and unique-so unique that it cannot compare to the
English common law, and a fortiori, to other legal systems even
farther removed. No doubt, classical Islamic law would be the last
system they would find even remotely comparable to the American
one concerning the function of lenity and the role of the courts. Yet,
might the attempt to distinguish the American rule of lenity conceal
key aspects of such rules in other contexts? Might the resulting
inward focus present an uninformed picture of whether the American

61.
Id. at 535-56 (listing separation of powers and due process as the two
primary constitutional rationales for lenity and adducing several "nonconstitutional"
arguments for lenity as well).
62.
Spector concludes based on this analysis that it is incoherent to apply lenity
to sentencing statutes. Doing so ignores the fact that judicial discretion over sentencing
is legislatively conferred. Thus, a "sentencing rule of lenity" cannot serve the structural
and procedural purposes-nondelegation and due process-underlying the textual
version of the lenity rule. Id. at 512. But see, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S.
333, 342 (1981) ("[W]e [have] recognized that the rule of lenity is a principle of
statutory construction which applies not only to interpretations of the substantive
ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.").
63.
Spector, supra note 51, at 520-21 (emphasis added).
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system is in fact unique, potentially obscuring important features of
our system and its comparative value for evaluating others? For
comparative insights, it is worth investigating how Islamic law dealt
with questions of doubt in criminal law, and the meaning it gave to
legislative supremacy and lenity.

III. LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL LAW
Like the nondelegation vision of American lenity, Islamic law
has always promoted a strong form of legislative supremacy. The
significant difference is that the medieval Islamic law version was
stronger because it was divine and absolute. Muslims conceived of
God as the sole Legislator; obedience to Him through implementing
His law was sacred duty. 64 Muslim theologians and jurists had a
relatively straightforward answer to the positivist question of why
people should follow the law: religious texts-namely the Qur'an and
prophetic edicts-required it. Accordingly, common slogans of Muslim
political movements from the seventh century through the twentyfirst urge adherence to divine sovereignty, and are in fact the same
phrases found approvingly throughout early and medieval Islamic
jurisprudential literature: "Every rule of law comes from God" and
"God is the [sole] Lawgiver."65 No one-not even the Prophet
Muhammad, much less judges-had discretion to diverge even
slightly from the law of God. The Prophet was simply a bearer of
God's message expressed through the Qur'anic revelation. 66 The
articulation and implementation of the Prophet's life example (as well
as that of a series of Imams who assumed religious leadership after
the Prophet in Shi 'I law and theology) provide a clarifying source of
law-which jurists refer to as the Sunna. 67 The Qur'in and Sunna
together were taken as normative and thus form the foundational, or
"constitutional," sources of Islamic law.

64.
The only required step to falling under its aegis was recognizing one deity
as God and Muhammad as His last Prophet, thus triggering recognition of their
authority over law (that is, "the rule of recognition" for Islamic contexts). Cf. H. L. A.
94-95 (2d ed. 1994) ("[The] 'rule of
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
recognition'. . . specif[ies] some feature or features possession of which by a suggested
rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be
supported by the social pressure it exerts. The existence of such a rule of recognition
may take any one of a wide variety of forms, simple or complex . . . . [Reducing all rules
to writing in one place] is not itself the crucial step, though it is a very important one:
what is crucial is the acknowledgement of reference to the writing or inscription as
authoritative,i.e., as the proper way of disposing of doubts as to the existence of the
rule.").
65.
BERNARD WEISS, SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAw 36 (1998).
66.
For an overview, see Roy P. Mottahedeh, Introduction to MUHAMMAD BAQIR
AS-SADR, LESSONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 1-27 (Roy P. Mottahedeh trans., 2003).
67.
Id.
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The medieval Islamic political structure did not conceive of,
much less mandate, three separate branches of government in the
way America and most other nations do today. 68 In fact, Islamic
political theorist typically maintained that there was no temporal
authority over divine law at all.6 9 In the most basic terms, there were
only two government branches: (1) an executive-the caliph or sultan
who took charge of community leadership and was responsible for
executing God's law after the Prophet Mulammad's death 7 0-and (2)
"courts"-the body of judges who helped the executive implement that
law. 71 Alongside the government was a third group-legal scholars, or
"jurists"-who developed expertise in matters of law and legal
interpretation and thus came to be recognized as the appropriate
agents to say what the law is.72 All were meant to be merely faithful
agents of a divine Legislator. The Arabic term for caliph, khalffa,
quite literally means "agent" or "deputy."7 3 The jurists aimed to carry
on divine and prophetic teachings to aid the caliph in implementing
God's law.
In the Islamic criminal law arena, as we will see, issues of
constitutional structure concerning the authority to interpret and
enforce the law were most pronounced. According to Muslims, God
drafted a series of fixed, mandatory criminal sanctions called hude7d,
in the foundational sources of law (the Qur'in and the Sunna).74 So
explicit were these laws that Muslim leaders easily understood
adherence to them as the prime example of upholding the doctrine of
divine legislative supremacy. That is, even if the argument could be
made elsewhere that God had delegated the task of elaborating the
law, in criminal law, such an argument was extremely difficult given
the explicit nature of the laws. Instead, early Muslims concluded that
no one-neither political nor juristic authorities-could make or alter
hudad laws.7 5
Yet, jurists seemed to do just that through the guise of legal
canons. Notably, they developed the hudtd maxim, an Islamic law
parallel to the rule of lenity, cautioning judges to "avoid hudetd

68.

See generally A. K. S. LAMBTON, STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL

IsLAM: AN INTRODUCTION

(discussing
69.
70.
71.

TO THE STUDY OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL THEORY (1981)

the structure of Islamic government and its relation to Islam).
Id.
Id.
Id.

72.
See, e.g., PATRICIA CRONE & MARTIN HINDS, GOD'S CALIPH: RELIGIOUS
AUTHORITY IN THE FIRST CENTURIES OF ISLAM 48-49 (1986).

73.
Id. at 4-5.
74.
RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 6-8, 53-65 (2005).
75.

ABJ AL-IASAN AL-MAWARDI, 1 KITAB AL-HUDUD MIN AL-HAWI AL-KABIR 100-

01 (Ibrihim b. 'Ali Sanduqji ed., 1995) (citing the opinion of early Iraqi judge and legal
scholar Ibn Qutayba for the proposition that "it is impermissible for anyone to exceed
or decrease" the scope of the law or the associated punishment).
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76
sanctions in cases of doubt or ambiguity." How did these jurists
justify this maxim within Islam's strict doctrine of legislative
supremacy and constrained judicial discretion, especially in matters
of criminal law?

A. Structures of Islamic Law and Governance
Typical premodern Islamic legal and governmental systems
differed significantly from modern ones. Most modern Muslimmajority states-at least in form-tend to follow an American-style
tri-partite structure of three branches: executive, legislative, and
judicial." But medieval polities followed a different division of labor,
owing to theological, historical, and other factors accompanying
Islam's advent and subsequent religio-political history.
When Islam first emerged in seventh century Arabia,
Muhammad became the religious and political head of a fledgling but
expanding Muslim community. He claimed to be a prophet, bringing
revelation from God, and Muslims looked to his life example for
guidance on issues of law and morality. During his lifetime, the
community believed that the sole legislator was God, and the Prophet
merely an exponent of God's legislation.78 In actual judgments, no one
had discretion to apply anything outside of that law, not even the
Prophet.7 9 This very thick version of legislative supremacy shows up
most starkly in criminal law. To the Prophet is attributed a famous
quote in a case where he told members of the elite who tried to
intervene on behalf of a member of their clan, that even his hands
were tied from pardoning a woman who had a proven record of theft:
"Would you intervene on a matter involving God's criminal laws
(huded Allah)?! ... I swear by God that even if Fitima, daughter of
Muhammad [my own daughter], had stolen, I would cut off her
For discussion of the origins and development of the rule, see Intisar A.
76.
Rabb, Islamic Legal Maxims as Substantive Canons of Construction: Huddid-Avoidance
in Cases of Doubt, 17 J. ISLAMIC L. & SOc'Y 63, 114-16 (2010).
Muslims form the majority of populations from Southeast Asia to Sub77.
Saharan Africa, and the Organization of Islamic Conference comprises fifty-seven
states spread over four continents. For an insightful review of constitutional structures
and legal systems in the modern Middle East, see generally NATHAN J. BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD: ARAB BASIC LAWS & THE PROSPECTS
FOR ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT (2001). For the role of religion in areas outside of the
IN
RELIGION
VON
ROLLE
ZUR
generally
see
East,
Middle
Arab
DEMOKRATISIERUNGSPROZESSEN (Mirjam Kunkler & Julia Leininger eds., 2009)
(describing a comparative study of the role of religious institutions in democratic
transition and consolidation processes).
For overviews of the legal structure during the Prophet's lifetime and
78.
immediately after, see $UBHI MAHMA$ANi, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JURISPRUDENCE IN
ISLAM 15-16 (Farhat J. Ziadeh trans., E.J. Brill 1961) (1946) and Mottahedeh, supra
note 66, at 4-14.
See sources cited supranote 78.
79.
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hand!"8 0 The story offers a rebuke to those who tried to encourage
leniency for high-status offenders. Quite likely, it also represents
later attempts to curb such practices, which had become regular
occurrences in the Umayyad and 'Abblisid dynasties of the eighth and
ninth centuries.81 More generally, the anecdote is instructive for the
view that the hudad laws bound even the Prophet.
The Prophet's death in 632 CE caused a crisis over succession
that changed the political organization of the Muslim community.82
The community emerged with a series of four caliphs who asserted
absolute political authority and consulted with learned companions
and family members of the Prophet about issues of law and religion.83
The caliphs' judicial appointments were drawn from the same ranks
of these learned circles. 84 As senior members of these circles, the
caliphs instructed governors and judges with general policies on
judging,8 5 resolved difficult legal questions,8 6 and often issued direct

80.
According to the sources, the woman-who was from a prominent clan in
the Prophet's own tribe of the Quraysh-used to borrow money then deny that she had
borrowed it, amounting to theft. For records of these reports in mid-ninth century
Sunni canonical hadith collections, see ABU DAWUD AL-SIJISTANI, 4 SUNAN 133, nos.
4373-74 (Muhammad 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Khalidi ed., 1996); AMMAD B. SHU'AYB AL-NASA'I,
4 AL-SUNAN AL-KUBRA 330 (Hasan 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Shalabi ed., 2001); ABO BAKR ALBAYHAQI, 8 SUNAN 267, no. 17004 (Mubammad 'Abd al-Qadir 'At&' ed., 1994).
81.
Cf. Maribel Fierro, When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt, 5 HAWWA 208, 233
(listing cases where the budad maxim was used to benefit high-status offenders).
82.
The Prophet's death has been labeled the first "crisis of Muslim history."
MAHMOUD M. AYOUB, THE CRISIS OF MUSLIM HISTORY: RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
EARLY ISLAM 7 (2003). Former companions of the Prophet succeeded in squashing
breakaway groups and managed to maintain a hold on power during a period of rapid
expansion. They made executive decisions about military campaigns, tax collection,
and gubernatorial and other administrative appointments. See HUGH KENNEDY, THE
PROPHET AND THE AGE OF THE CALIPHATES: THE ISLAMIC NEAR EAST FROM THE SIXTH

TO THE ELEVENTH CENTURY 50-81 (2d ed. 1986).
83.
These caliphs laid some claim to religio-legal authority too, though in a
more diffused fashioned, shared with scholars who contributed to the elaboration of
ritual, family, commercial and public law. See CRONE & HINDS, supra note 72, at 2-3
(arguing that caliphs after Abdl Bakr saw themselves not just as political authorities
but religious authorities as well).
84.
For example, the Prophet appointed his cousin, 'All (who went on to become
the fourth caliph and first Shil' Imam) and young companion Mu'idh b. Jabal to
judgeships in Yemen during his lifetime. MUHAMMAD B. KHALAF WAKI', AKHBAR ALQUipAT 62-72 (Said Muhammad al-Lahhim, 1950). The first judges in other centers at
the time, including Mecca, Kufa, Basra, Damascus, and Egypt, were also learned
companions and family members who recounted prophetic practices in their own
adjudications. See, e.g., BAYHAQI, supra note 80, no. 17390 (describing companion and
Kufan judge Ibn Mas'id's adjudication of a criminal accusation by reference to
prophetic practice); NASAk', supra note 80, no. 4887 (Ibn 'Umar reporting the Prophet's
application of a badd sentence); AL-HAKIM AL-NAYSABORI, 4 AL-MUSTADRAK 'AL 'LSAtIAYN 134 (1997).
85.
See, e.g., ABU AL-'ABBAS AL-QALQASHANDi,

10 SUBH AL-A'SHA 21, 79, 359

(1981) (containing letters from the caliphs to regional governors, especially the letter
from 'Umar to Abai Musa al-Ash'ar); Letter no. 53, in AL-SHARiF AL-RAIpI, NAHJ ALBALAGHA (Subhi al-Sllih ed., 1967) (containing a letter sent from 'Ali to his Malik al-
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legal rulings themselves.87 Yet, they too saw themselves as beholden
to the supremacy of the divine law. One judicial appointment story
has it that a scholar challenged the second caliph 'Umar b. al-Khatitb
for the destruction of a borrowed item, and the caliph was so
impressed with the arbiter's reasoning-even though the decision was
against him-that he appointed the arbiter a judge.8 8
Within decades of the Prophet's death, the advent of Umayyad
rule-the first of a series of dynasties-shifted the political
organization once again.8 9 Government continued to have its twopronged structure of executive and judicial branches. But deficiencies
of religious legitimacy and competence now forced the government
actors to cede most interpretive authority over to the body of nonstate jurists.9 0 The historical sources portray the caliphate during
this period as having gone from being an office of moral leadership
concerned with establishing a just social order to one of tribal
loyalties based on might-makes-right. 9 ' The state-appointed judges
consulted the expert "jurists"-from the learned circles of scholars 9 2who continued to develop the law outside of state involvement and
control.9 3 Further, the jurists formed a part of a "pious opposition" to

Ashtar upon sending him to Egypt to take over as governor, which explicates judicial
policy).
86.
See, e.g., WAK, supra note 84, at 360 (noting that the Iraqi judge Shurayb
b. al-Harith wrote to 'Umar for help in resolving issues of evidence and liability in a
case of murder).
Most famous was the second caliph, 'Umar b. al-Khattib, who ruled for ten
87.
years (634-644), and instituted lasting changes to the law itself. See MAHMASANi,
supra note 78, at 110-14 (listing his precedents concerning alms-tax, divorce, slave
law, theft, sexual crimes, and discretionary punishments). There is indication that,
while his religio-legal authority was not absolute, judges who questioned it did so at
their own risk. WAKt, supra note 84, at 173-75 (noting that the Basran judge lyas b.
Subayh was compared to the false prophet Musaylima when he contested the second
caliph's opinions on ritual purity).
88.
WAKi, supra note 84, at 357 (appointment story of Shurayh, see supra note
87).
For a survey of Muslim dynasties, including a list of Umayyad rulers, see
89.
CLIFFORD EDMUND BOSWoRTH, THE NEW ISLAMIC DYNASTIES (2d ed. 2004).
For the early development of this shift, see generally M. QASIM ZAMAN,
90.
RELIGION AND POLITICS UNDER THE EARLY 'ABBASIDS: THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROTo-

SUNNI ELITE (1997).
AYOUB, supra note 82, at 54-57 (arguing that this transformation to tribal
91.
loyalty began with 'Uthman); cf. LOUISE MARLOWE, HIERARCHY AND EGALITARIANISM
IN ISLAMIC THOUGHT 14-16, 28 (2002) (detailing a social egalitarian bent during the
early Islamic period that became explicitly hierarchal during 'Uthmin's time and that
Mu'awiya's assumption of leadership based on bloodlines ended "the opportunity for
social equalising" on the basis of piety criteria).
92.

WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF IsLAMIC LAW 38-39

(2005) (citing an instance where an Egyptian judge was appointed despite his lack of
knowledge of inheritance laws).
For accounts of the early schools, beginning in the Umayyad reign and
93.
lasting until the formalization of legal doctrine under the early 'Abblsids, see generally
NURIT TSAFRIR, THE HISTORY OF AN ISLAMIC SCHOOL OF LAW: THE EARLY SPREAD OF

1320

VANDERBILTJOURNA L oF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 44:-1299

the government, reacting to what history depicts as the widespread
and well-known Umayyad excesses. 94 In that capacity, the jurists
insisted on divine legislative supremacy over political and religiolegal spheres alike.9 5
The early period of the next regime, the 'Abbasid dynasty, saw
the professionalization of the juristic classes as their teaching circles
and their informal jurisprudential approaches developed into formal
schools of law. 96 All of the jurists who became the eponyms of the
enduring schools of Islamic law lived during this time: the heads of
the main Sunni law schools, Abii Hanifa (d. 767) of the Ianafi school,
Mllik (d. 795) of the Maliki school, Shafi'T (d. 819) of the ShafiT
school, and Ibn lanbal (d. 855) of the janball school, as well as that
of the main Shil' school, Jafar al-Sadiq (d. 765).97 This time was also
one of a rising textual tradition of law. During the ninth and tenth
centuries, scholars compiled the famous collections of hadfth reports
as sources for the Sunna and began to author the first full treatises
on law (fiqh) and jurisprudence (usal al-fiqh) in attempts to
systematize the law.9 8 Likewise, the group that was to form the Shi'I
community looked to jurists from their own ranks for religious
guidance, knowledge of which came from devotion to the teachings of
the Prophet and his family through continued study and
transmission." The fifth and sixth Imams in a line of twelve
(Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Ja'far al-Sidiq) were in fact so

HANAFISM (2004) and HARALD MOTZKI, THE ORIGINS OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE:
MEccAN FIQH BEFORE THE CLASSICAL SCHOOLS (Marion H. Katz trans., Brill 2002)
(1991).
See JONATHAN P. BERKEY, THE FORMATION OF ISLAM: RELIGION AND
94.
SOCIETY IN THE NEAR EAST, 600-1800, at 84-85 (2003) (noting that while not all of the
opposition was religious-some of it championing Arab ascendancy-most of it was, as
diverse pockets of scholars and other members of the elite became increasingly
distressed at reported Umayyad divergence from Qur'Rnic and prophetic principles of
justice).
95.
Id.
See MAHMAsANI, supra note 78, at 17-19.
96.
There were dozens, if not hundreds, more. See GEORGE MAKDISI, THE RISE
97.
OF COLLEGES: INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING IN ISLAM AND THE WEST 2-4 (1981)
(estimating up to five hundred such proto-Sunni schools, most of which died out by the
end of the ninth century).
MAIjMASANI, supra note 78, at 17-19 (calling this period the Golden Age,
98.
which accompanied the major translation movement from Greek into Arabic, the
flowering of literature, and 'Abbisid patronage of the arts and sciences); see HOSSEIN
MODARRESSI, AN INTRODUCTION TO SHTI LAW: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL STUDY 4-5 (1984)
(listing the four canonical Shil' compilations of hadith-reports of the Prophet and
Imams' words and practices). For discussions of the development of the hadrth
compilations in Sunni, see generally JONATHAN BROWN, THE CANONIZATION OF
BUKHARI AND MUSLIM: THE FORMATION AND FUNCTION OF THE SUNNI IIADITH
TRADITION (2007) (listing the six canonical Sunni compilations of fradth-reports of the
Prophet's words and practices).
HOSSEIN MODARRESSI, CRISIS AND CONSOLIDATION IN THE FORMATIVE
99.
PERIOD OF SHPITE ISLAM 29 (1993).
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universally well-regarded that eponyms of some Sunni schools sought
knowledge of the law from them as well.100
In this period, it became clear that caliphal power over the law
was to be limited to issues of the public sphere, while the jurists
maintained authority over the religio-legal spheres. Where there was
overlap-as there was in criminal law-the two groups worked
together under the notion that they were to adhere to the will of God
and follow the example of the Prophet in deference to the entrenched
notion of divine legislative supremacy.101

B. Islamic Theories of Governance and Criminal Law
By the second half of the 'Abbasid rule, caliphs and scholars
reached a compromise around the contours of the preceding
generations' understandings of political and juristic authority over
criminal law within the confines of divine legislative supremacy. In
the tenth and eleventh centuries, jurists from both Sunni and Shi'i
communities produced definitive works of legal and political
theory.102

These works of political theory more precisely laid out the
relationship between politics and juridical scholarship concerning the
proper divisions of labor over matters of law. The eleventh century
jurist Ab5 al-Hasan al-Milwardi (d. 1058) is credited as the first to
propound a developed theory of "Islamic governance" in his book alAhkam al-sultaniyya [Rules of Governance]. 03 In it, he drew on
earlier writings on the issues to draw conclusions from the centurieslong contests over religious and political authority. 104 From the
Prophet's death until his time, he observed that the community had
been forced to make difficult decisions about law and governance.10 5
The constitutional sources did not speak directly to new issues that
constantly cropped up, and this forced community leaders to exercise
a considerable amount of interpretive agency.' 0 6 His was an attempt
to account for the insertion of human interpretation into the legal

100.
For instance, AbEi Hanifa and others reportedly studied under him. See
Mottahedeh, supra note 66, at 5-8.
101.
See generally ZAMAN, supra note 90 (discussing the development of nonstate jurists as interpretive authorities).
102.
For a history of the legal theoretical works in the Sunni context, see WAEL
B. HALLAQ, IsLAMIc LEGAL THEORIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNI USfJL AL-FIQH 33
(1997) and for the Shil context, MODARRESSI, supra note 99, at 7.
103.
ABO AL-HASAN AL-MAWARDI, AL-AHKAM AL-SULTANIYYA WA'L-WILAYAT ALDINJYYA 250 (Muhammad Fahmi al-Sirjiini ed., 1978).
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
See ZAMAN, supra note 90 (examining various loci of political and legal
authority).
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process, despite the doctrine of divine legislative supremacy with its
accompanying version of an Islamic nondelegation doctrine.
In what had come to be a point of consensus by his time, only
jurists who had received the requisite training were qualified to
interpret Islamic law.10 7 However, the ruler enjoyed considerable
discretion over issues of public law by virtue of his duties to enforce
the law, ensure the continued existence of the community, and
preserve the sanctity of the public sphere. 108 Miwardi discussed
these duties in terms of a ruler's overarching obligation to vindicate
"God's claims" (buqCIq Allah) over the community as supreme
Legislator. This is a point to which we will return. For now, it is
sufficient to note that enforcement of hudztd laws was one of the few
public duties required of the executive, and it was the main area of
overlap in spheres of authority claimed by the jurists who articulated
the law, and the rulers who enforced it.1 09
In the final analysis, Mlwardi articulated concisely what caliphs
and scholars had long come to recognize: in matters of law and
politics, each had an area of primary jurisdiction, and they were to
work together in areas of overlap.1 10 The caliphs did not-and, no
doubt, could not-assume sweeping religious authority over the
law.11 1
This developed model of Islamic political theory comprised three
main institutions split along secular and religious lines. Two were
governmental: the executive had political and decision-making
authority over enforcing criminal laws, while the judiciary, as a
deputy to the executive, applied these laws. 112 Both were to rely on a
third institution, the non-governmental body of jurists, who had the
institutional competence as well as the epistemic and moral authority
to define the law, drawing from its foundational sources.113 In this
way, Miwardi argued, the Muslim polity would remain true to its
fundamental precepts that required using instruments of law and
governance to implement the will of the supreme Lawgiver. 114
Between the government branches and the jurists, a separation of

107.
See Intisar A. Rabb, Islamic Legal Minimalism, in STUDIES IN ISLAMIC LAW
AND TRADITION *1, *13-16 (Michael Cook et al. eds., forthcoming 2012) (noting that
mainstream Sunni communities required trained jurists to interpret Islam's
foundational legal texts); cf. MODARRESSI, supra note 99, at 27-29 (noting that the
early mainstream Imitmi Shil' community believed the authority of the Imims to have
been founded on them being learned scholars).
MAWARDI, supra note 103, at 250.
108.
109.
See id. at 90-94 (including enforcement of hudad laws in a short list of ten
public duties that the executive authority of the state must fulfill).
110.
Id.
111.
See ZAMAN, supra note 90.
112.
MAWARDI, supra note 103, at 250.
113.
See ZAMAN, supranote 90.
114.
MAWARDI, supra note 103, at 250.
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powers of sorts obtained, with the jurists providing a check against
the government and ensuring that it remained within the confines of
the Law-at least symbolically if not always in fact.' 15

C. Hudfid Crimes and Punishments
Against this backdrop, 4udad laws took on many changes in
definition as jurists confronted actual criminal cases and tried to
limit the punishments authorized by the state through defining the
punishments outlined in the Islamic legal texts. The term "budad"
refers to both the major crimes and their associated punishments in
Islamic criminal law." 6 While in theory budad laws came from God
and humans were barred from making or altering these laws, the
matter was less clear-cut in practice. Jurists found it difficult to
determine the legitimate application or scope of interpretation for
hudad because of the often indeterminate nature of Islamic legal
texts in both form and substance. The Qur'in was a static text but
sparse on details of law. 1 '7 The more detailed Sunna was known
through a series of scattered badth texts of often dubious
authenticity.1 18 The absence of a single code or document clearly
detailing the law always presented questions to jurists' inquiries as to
just what the law was. Case in point: Muslim jurists did not even
agree on what counted as budad laws. For example, they disputed
whether blasphemy, highway robbery, and even murder were "true"
(divinely legislated) budad crimes with fixed punishments-as
detailed below.
The jurists did agree that Islamic law specifies at least four
hudad crimes: illicit sexual relations (such as fornication or adultery),
of sexual
accusations
slanderous
(specifically,
defamation
impropriety), theft, and intoxication. 19 By contrast, they treated
murder as a quasi-badd crime: it was a grave offense punishable by
death, but it involved some degree of discretion on the part of the
victim's family to pardon the offender and accept a set amount of
financial compensation instead. 120 This may be surprising to the
reader familiar with modern laws of murder as the quintessential

See id. (delineating the duties of jurists versus the executive-the former
115.
charged with interpreting the law, the latter with enforcing it); cf. NOAH FELDMAN,
THE FALL AND RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE 44-48 (2008) (describing the juristsexecutive division as a separation of powers).
116.
See, e.g., MAWARDI, supra note 75, at 100-01.
117.
See Mottahedeh, supra note 66, at 2.
Id., at 11-13.
118.
For an overview of Islamic criminal laws, see PETERS, supra note 74, at 53119.
65.
See id. at 38-53 ("In cases of homicide and bodily harm the plaintiffs may
120.
demand either retaliation or financial compensation.").
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crime. But the premodern Islamic conception came out of explicit
Qur'anic regulations of existing practices and corresponded to
medieval laws of talion, the "eye-for-an-eye" doctrines that specified
rules of retaliation or financial compensation for homicide and
personal injury.121 In the study of Islamic law, scholars have likened
these rules to tort law rather than criminal law. 122
Finally, while the Islamic legal treatises often treated rebellion
in sections accompanying criminal law, jurists typically viewed
rebellion as a category of political resistance, which was not banned
or criminalized by the legal sources. 12 3 Rather, the Qur'in bans
brigandry and acts of terrorism, from which rebels were to be
distinguished.1 2 4 As leading scholars of Islamic law have recently
shown, medieval jurists developed a highly nuanced jurisprudence on
the legality of rebellion and the treatment of rebels in a sophisticated
line of thought that reflected Qur'iinic ideals and the historical
circumstances of political upheaval and uncertainty in the early
Muslim community. 2 5
The short list of four or five crimes expanded and contracted as
the criminal elements and scope of the laws often depended on the

See Elmar Klinger, Revenge and Retribution, in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
121.
RELIGION 7779-84 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005). For examples of differing
approaches to vengeance across time and space, see VENGEANCE IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE
87 (Kelly Gibson & Daniel Lord Smail eds., 2009) (medieval period) and MARTHA
MINow, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1998) (modern period).
For a discussion drawing the comparison between talion and tort in the
122.
Islamic law context, see J. N. D. Anderson, Homicide in Islamic Law, 13 BULL. SCH.
ORIENTAL & AFR. STUDS. 811 (1951). For perspectives on how Islamic law attempted to
ameliorate pre-Islamic practices of private administration that often fueled ongoing
tribal wars, see PETERS, supra note 74, at 38-53 ("The origins of this part of the law go
back to the pre-Islamic custom of feuding, which allowed revenge for killing and bodily
harm on all members of the tribe of the perpetrator. This often resulted in feuds that
could last for generations. These feuds would cease if the victim's family would accept
compensation, to be paid collectively by all members of the tribe. With the advent of
Islam, this institution of revenge was drastically modified... . The most important
reforms were that revenge in kind could only be taken on the person of the offender
and only after due trial."). For the Qur'inic regulations, see QUR'AN 4:92 (outlining the
laws of homicide, including compensatory rules for accidental homicide); id. 5:45
(permitting retaliation for personal injury but encouraging financial compensation in
its stead: "Whoever forgoes [physical retaliation in the way of charity] it shall be
expiation for that person."); id. 2:178-2:179 ("[T]here is life for you in qi naS, oh people of
understanding, so that perhaps you might learn God-consciousness [restraint].").
For a detailed treatment of the Islamic laws of rebellion, see generally
123.
KHALED ABOU EL FADL, REBELLION AND VIOLENCE IN ISLAMIC LAW (2001) (examining
the concept and treatment of political resistance in Islamic law).
124.
Id. at 32.
125.
Cf. Sherman A. Jackson, Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal
Tradition, 91 MUSLIM WORLD 293-310 (2001) (discussing the correspondence between
classic Islamic law and features of domestic terrorism in the United States). See
generally ABOU EL FADL, supra note 123, at 125 (discussing the role of Muslim jurists
in restructuring and constructing a discourse on rebellion).
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constructions that jurists gave them.126 At times, juristic definitions
of hudad laws encompassed acts with punishments not explicitly
mentioned in the texts of the Qur'an or Sunna. The two most
widespread instances of this were apostasy and highway robberyboth of which were mentioned in the Qur'in, but without defined
punishments.1 27 Though some jurists rejected a criminal
categorization for these acts, many jurists nevertheless counted them
as hudetd crimes. 128
In addition, jurists tinkered with the scope of huded laws by
construing certain texts narrowly or broadly. For instance, some
jurists counted bestiality or sodomy under the rubric of hudzld sex
crimes while others restricted the hudad label to illicit, heterosexual
sex acts between two people.' 2 9 Only Hanafis outlined a robust notion
of blasphemy as a crime.1 30 Most jurists regarded sacrilegious
statements against the Prophet as mere words that were not
tantamount to apostasy, restricting the meaning of apostasy to
explicit denials of the existence of God or the prophecy of
Muhammad."ax The punishments for all of these crimes were severethey ranged from reprimand, fines, and shaming to imprisonment,
corporal punishment, and death.132
Crimes that did not fit under the hudad rubric were those that
were not clearly specified in the sources and so involved some

126.
Intisar A. Rabb, Doubt's Benefit: Legal Maxims in Islamic Law, 7th-16th
Centuries, 24-25, 263-81 (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton
University) (on file with Mudd Library, Princeton University).
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
130.
Intisar A. Rabb, Speech in Islamic Law and Politics, in ISLAMIC AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND (Anver Emon et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2012).
131.
Id. For classifications of crimes amongst jurists from the period of the
earliest works of law in the eighth century, see for example, 'ABD ALLAH MUHAMMAD
AL-JUBURi, 2 FLQH AL-IMM AL-AwZA'i 30 (1977) (listing sex crimes, defamation,
intoxication, theft-the four agreed-upon crimes-plus apostasy (ridda) and highway
robbery (qat' al-tarTq)). For classifications as they had developed in the twelfth century,
see ABJ HAMID AL-GHAZALi,

2 AL-WAJIZ F! FIQH AL-IMAM

AL-SHAFI'i

163

('All

Mu'awwad & 'Adil 'Abd al-Mawjid eds., 1997) (listing all seven); IBN RUSHD II, 2
BIDAYAT AL-MUJTAHID 577 ('All Muhammad Mu'awwad & 'Adil Ahmad 'Abd alMawjld eds., 2000) (listing eight categories-the seven mentioned plus retaliation
(qisds) for murder or personal injury).
132.
See PETERS, supra note 74, at 30-38 (listing the penalties: reprimand
(ta'dfb), fines (ghurm, ursh), public exposure to shame (tashhir) (which may include
shaving the head and parading around town on the back of a donkey), banishment
(nafy, taghrTb), imprisonment (habs), flogging (jald),amputation of the hand or foot in
some cases (qajt), cross-amputation (e.g., of the right hand and left foot) (al-qat' min
khildf), retaliation (qisyd) or financial compensation (diya) for personal injuries and
murder; the death penalty (qatl)(through various methods, including lapidation (rajm)
for adultery), sometimes in combination with crucifixion (salb), and other non-punitive
legal consequences (e.g., a bar from testifying in court)).
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(qisas) and

discretionary penalties (ta 'zfr).13 3 Retaliation laws were discretionary

in that they permitted a victim or her family to decide whether to
commute like-for-like retaliation with blood money. 134 The laws of
discretionary penalties comprised the rest of the non-huded criminal
laws-a catch-all category of acts that were considered offenses but
never defined as such in the sources.' 35 Criminalization of these acts
was justified by a combination of prior practices, political prerogative,
and arguments about necessity.1 36 Though jurisdiction over these
offenses was largely in the purview of political authorities, the jurists
defined and specified sentence ranges for these acts too, in their
attempts to counter-define the hudad laws.' 37
Jurists did not see their interpretive activities as juridical
legislation. To the contrary, the sources suggest that they staunchly
subscribed to the doctrine of legislative supremacy and saw hudad
laws as authorized by nothing less than divine origins. Where a
critical textualist or common law lawyer might see juridical
legislation and common law crimes, most Muslim jurists conceived of
themselves as restraining their own discretion and that of the
political authorities in deference to the legislative supremacy of God.
Yet, the indeterminate nature of the texts, the ambiguities
surrounding the definition of the specified crimes compared to realworld acts, and the high stakes of criminal convictions, drove them to
develop firm criteria for defining the law, which may have appeared
to be legislation in the guise of interpretation. In short, despite-or

133.
See id. at 65-68 ("Executive officials and judges ... may, at their discretion,
impose corrective punishment on those who have committed such acts.").
134.
Only a minority of jurists placed the laws of qisay in the hudad category.
See, e.g., BADR AL-DIN AL-'AYN!, 6 AL-BINAYA F SHARIH AL-HIDAYA 190 (Ayman Salih
Sha'ban, 1930) (noting that Bazdawi does so in his Mabsat); IBN RUSHD II, supra note
131, at 577.
135.
PETERS, supra note 74, at 65-68.
136.
Mlwardi maintained that unspecified crimes were punishable at the
discretion of a presiding judge according to the policy preferences of the political
authority (siydsa) if they constituted behavior that would compromise public order or
the public interest (maslaha) that the caliph was charged with upholding. See
MAWARDI, supra note 75, at 1022 (maintaining that the ruler must apply ta'zfr
punishments in instances that affect the public interest).
137.
For the growth of these definitions to accommodate new societal situations
and theoretical expansions in one legal school, see for example IBN HAJAR AL-HAYTAMI,
4 TUUFAT AL-MUHTAJ SHARH AL-MINHAJ 160-64 ('Abd Allah Mahmld Muhammad
'Umar ed., 2001); YAHYA B. SHARAF AL-NAWAWI, 3 MiNHAJ AL-TALIBIN 246 (Ahmad b.
'Abd al-Aziz al-Haddid, 2000); ABJ HAMID AL-GHAZALI, 6 AL-WASiT F AL-MADHHAB
513-16 (Ahmad Mahmiid Ibrahim & Muhammad Muhammad Timir eds., 1997);
MUHAMMAD ZUHRI AL-GHAMRAWI, ANWAR AL-MASALIK SHARU JUMDAT AL-SALIK LIAUMAD B. AL-NAQIB 468 (1996); MUHAMMAD AL-KHATiB AL-SHIRBINi, 5 MUGHNI AL-

MUIjTAJ ILA MA'RIFAT MA'ANI ALFAZ AL-MINHAJ 522-26 ('All Muhammad Mu'awwal &
'Adil Ahmad 'Abd al-Mawjaid eds., 1994); SHAMS AL-DIN MUHAMMAD B. AHMAD ALRAMLi, 8 NIHAYAT AL-MUHTAJ ILA SHARH AL-MINHAJ 18-22 (1938).
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rather, because of-the doctrine of legislative supremacy, ambiguity
and severity in hudad laws made it crucial for jurists to refine the
definitions and theory of Islamic criminal law. They not only had to
distinguish hudad laws from other criminal laws conceptually, but
they also had to devise some principled means of arguing that they
were upholding both the letter and the spirit of all criminal laws in a
way that paid due deference to the divine Legislator. It is against this
backdrop that the huded maxim was born.13 8

IV. THE "IsLAMIc

RULE OF LENITY": EQUITABLE
EXCEPTIONS TO MANDATORY SANCTIONS

Jurists invoked the hutdad maxim-"avoid impoling criminal
sanctions in cases of doubt (idra 'l7-hudad bi'l-shubahdt)"-widely
to avoid imposing penal sanctions. 139 At the same time, they insisted
on the mandatoriness of enforcing hudad laws as rules of obligation
binding on the state. 140 If huded enforcement were mandatory, the
widespread invocation of the maxim for hudad avoidance demanded
some sort of justification within the general theories of Islamic
criminal law and governance. Moreover, if opposition to the
government's selective enforcement of hudad laws was at the heart of
the jurists' concerns and opposition to the government, they had to
announce some principled means to determine when to avoid and
when to enforce those laws. Toward that end, jurists elaborated
criminal law jurisprudence in principal part through the huded
maxim, then used that jurisprudence to articulate and give form to a
set of public values they held to be rooted in Islam's constitutional
texts. 141 I have previously outlined how jurists transformed the
hudeld maxim into a text, which they placed on par with other
foundational texts, thereby conferring on it the legal authority
commensurate with its centrality. 142 Here, I detail how they used the

138.
Like principles of lenity in the English common-law tradition, the budzd
maxim existed and was in use long before it became a formal principle of criminal law
that appeared regularly in legal treatises together with justifications and
enumerations of its use. See Rabb, supra note 77, at 123 (tracking reports of the hudad
maxim that attribute its use to the Prophets time and appear in the earliest surviving
works of law and hadtth from the eighth and ninth centuries).
139.
Id. at 66.
140.
Id. at 66, 121.

141.

Id.

142.
See Rabb, supra 77, at 69-77, 86-100. A minority of jurists-both in the
Sunni and Shri legal traditions-rejected the prophetic attributions of the maxim as a
hadth. See, e.g., 'ALI B. AHMAD IBN HAZM, 12 AL-MUHALIA BIL-ATHAR 57-63 ('Abd alGhaffar Sulaymlin al-Bandirl ed., 1988); IBN UAZM, 7 AL-IIIKAM F! USOL AL-AHKAM 45455 (1968) (complaining that applications of the hudmld maxim were lawless because
they contradicted the authentic texts of Islamic criminal law and would lead to a
complete cancellation of huded laws); cf. AL-HURR AL-'AMILi, 18 WASAIL AL-SHiA 127-
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hudad maxim to form a jurisprudence that privileged principles of
equity and fairness in the interpretation and application of criminal
law.
A. Equity Rationales
Muslim jurists used the hudtd maxim often as an equitable
principle to smooth over rigidities in tight applications of the text.
That is, they invoked the maxim whenever a failure to do so
threatened certain sensitive "rights" or substantive values underlying
Islamic law. Before arriving at that point, they had to first identify
the rights and moral values enumerated by Islam's foundational
sources, the Qur'in and the Sunna, then devise a theory for how to
balance one set of rights over another. That endeavor took place in
two stages, all within the context of the jurists' continuing
commitment to the theory of divine legislative supremacy. The first
stage put the divine front and center; it was a God-centered theory of
hudild laws that laid the foundation for the second stage. That second
stage featured arguments that were in large part human-centered
and counter-intuitively deployed as a way of better vindicating what
jurists took to be divine concerns with equity and justice.
1.

A Theological Theory of Hudad Laws: Rules of Moral Obligation

In addition to distinguishing hudtd laws from other criminal
offenses by defining them as acts that involved no measure of human
discretion (unlike qisas and ta'zfr: retaliation and discretionary
penalties), jurists came to conceive of hudad laws as rules of moral
obligation. They initially articulated this notion through a doctrine
contrasting a conception of hudad laws as "God's claims" or "rights"
(huqaqAlldh) with other laws, deemed "individual claims" or "rights"
(huqaq al-nds).143 These Muslims of the first three centuries did not
mean claims or rights in the sense used in modern Western liberal
traditions. 144 Rather, early scholars understood these concepts in
theological terms. Islamic theological notions of law defined legal

29 ('Abd al-Rahim al-Rabbani al-Shirazi ed., 1963-1969) (restricting the scope of hudzid
avoidance to factual rather than legal doubt based on competing traditions that advise
a rule of precaution rather than lenity in the face of legal doubts).
143.
See, e.g., Miriam Hoexter, Huqaq Allah and Huqaq al- Ibad as Reflected in
the Waqf Institution, 19 JERUSALEM STUD. ARABIC & ISLAM 133, 134 (1995); Baber
Johansen, Sacred and Religious Element in Hanafite Law-Functionand Limits of the
Absolute Characterof Government Authority, in ISLAM ET POLITIQUE AU MAGHREB 281,
299-300 (Ernest Gellner & Jean-Claude Vatin eds., 1981) (analyzing the relationship
between "the claims of God and the claims of men").
144.
For further discussion of huqczq generally, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM (P.
Bearman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2006) (s.v. huqiiq).
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duties simply as a general human obligation to follow the law as an
act of worship: God has a right to be worshipped, and individuals who
fulfill their duties of worship have a corresponding right not to be
punished. In other words, huded laws represent God's claims in the
sense that they are rules of obligation legislated by God for which
obedience is due.145
Jurists writing in the two major strands of Islamic theologySunni traditionalism and Shi'I or Mu'tazili rationalism-came to this
same conclusion, albeit by different means. 14 6 Traditionalists believe
that God has a prerogative to declare law.147 Thus, they allowed for
seeming injustices according to a definition of justice that only God
could understand.148 In their estimation, God demanded absolute
obedience through adherence to the law (in this case hudz2d laws),
which itself defines morality. Adherence to the law meant adherence
to morality, which should save people from punishment in the
afterlife.14 9 It is on this basis that one jurist explained uidad laws as
God's rights with reference to the following hadith: "Surely, the 'right'
(haqq) of God upon His servants is that they worship Him and do not
associate any partners with Him [in part, through following budad
laws], and the 'rights' (uqctq) of individuals vis-i-vis God is that
whoever refrains from associating partners with God will not be
punished." 50
For rationalists, by contrast, justice and morality were objective
concepts: God only creates rules that are moral and collective reason
usually can discern morality, and thus the law.15 Rationalists
maintained that out of His grace, God sent Prophets (and Imams) to
clarify the law.' 5 2 Accordingly, God holds Himself to a divine selfpromise to punish only objectively bad acts and reward good oneswhich is exactly the sense of justice that the human mind
comprehends.153 In juristic writings, this rationalist approach to law

Several scholars observe that hudctd enforcement is obligatory because
145.
these crimes and punishments fall within the scope of huqaq Allah. E.g., FAKEIR AL-DiN
AL-ZAYLA'I, 3 TABYIN AL-HAQA'IQ 539 (2000); AiMAD B. YAHfYA AL-WANSEARISI, 'UDDAT
AL-BURUQ F! JAM' MA Fi-'L-MADHHAB MIN AL-JUMfl WA'L-FURfJQ 671 (Hamza Abu Faris
ed., 1990); BURHAN AL-DIN AL-MARGHINANT, 2 AL-HIDAYA SHARH BIDAYAT AL-MUBTADI'

381 (Muhammad 'Adnan Darwish ed., 1966).
For a survey of the major theological strands in early Islamic thought, see
146.
generally J. VAN Ess, THEOLOGIE UND GESELLSCHAFT IM 2. UND 3. JAHRHUNDERT

HIDSCHRA: EINE GESCHICHTE DES RELIGIOSEN DENKENS IM FRUHEN ISLAM (1991).
See Rabb, supranote 126, ch. 6.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARkFL, 1 ANWAR AL-BURUQ F' ANWA' AL-FURUQ 269-70.

151.
152.

See Rabb, supranote 126, ch. 6.
Id.

153.

See MANKDIM SHASHDIW, TALIQ 'ALA SHARH AL-USUL AL-KHAMSA 207-33,

344-48, 434-79 (Abd al-Karim 'Uthman ed., 1965) (published as 'Abd al-Jabbar b.

1330

VANDERBILT/OUNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 44:1299

is famously encapsulated in the principle of correlation between
revelation and reason: "whatever reason dictates, the Lawgiver
legislates." 154 For rationalists, this principle applied to huded laws no
less than any other.
The theological conceptions of law then place all hudad laws into
the category of God's claims or rights in the sense of individual and
collective obligations. The two differing trends merely explain why
the obligations are due, in many ways mirroring the old split between
natural law theorists and positivists in modern common and civil law
contexts.15 5 For the government and legal spheres, both held a
conception of hudad that required individuals and political
authorities alike to obey and implement hudad laws as obligatory
acts of worship. That is, individuals were to avoid committing hudad
offenses, and political authorities were obliged to punish those who
committed them. The early legal scholars and theologians maintained
that, only in this way would Muslim societies give shape to the moral
order that God legislated through shara. This, at least, is the
56
theological notion of budad laws-as-moral obligation.1
2.

A Legal Theory of HudadLaws: Crimes as Public-Moral Offenses

Over time, jurists elaborated a more sophisticated notion in
which they took the God's rights-individual rights dichotomy to refer
to the public-versus-private nature of the interest offended by
commission of a crime. Hfudad crimes violate God's rights, they
argued, in the sense of offending public morality.157 They developed

Ahmad, Sharh al-usalal-khamsa, as clarified by D. Gimaret, Les usul al-hamsa du Q@Jt
Abd al-Gabbaret leurs commentaires," 15 ANNALES ISLAMOLOGIQUES, 47, 49 (1979)).
See MODARRESSI, supra note 98, at 4 (describing the principle of correlation
154.
as "religious rules [that] may be inferred from the sole verdict of reason").
Compare JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980)
155.
(expressing rights in terms of natural law), with HART, supra note 64 (defining the
obligation to obey the law with respect to rules from some recognized, authoritative
"legislative" source).
156.
For discussions of individual and government duties with respect to
criminal law, see MLWARDi, supra note 103, at 250 (including enforcement of hudctd
laws in a short list of ten public duties that the executive authority of the state must
fulfill); cf. ABfJ YA'LA IBN AL-FARRA', AL-AH{KAM AL-SULTANIYYA 27 (Muhammad Hamid
al-Fiqi ed., 1966) (same).
See Hoexter, supra note 143, at 133 ("Huquq Allah refers to the rights of
157.
the Islamic community and religion and their claims upon the individual."); Johansen,
supra note 143, at 302 (arguing that Hanafis established the huqilq Alldh-huqaq al'ibad distinction to account for "political justice in the name of God" and to alleviate
tensions between the "private and individualistic character of Hanafite law" and "the
public interest"). For an alternative view, see Anver Emon, Huqiq Allih & Huqiq al-

'Ibid, A Legal Heuristic for a NaturalRights Regime, 13 ISLAMIC L. & Soc'Y 325 (2006)
(arguing that the Muslim jurists invented the doctrine of huqaq Allah as an
interpretive mechanism used to create and distribute rights, duties, and public
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this argument with reference to both substantive and procedural
aspects of Islamic law.
Substantively, by the eleventh century, jurists extracted from
Islamic law five core public values, which they called "objectives of
the law: maqasid al-sharf a."'5 8 These jurists maintained that these
objectives were intended to promote the preservation of life, religion,
soundness of intellect, lineage, and property.159 They mapped these
values onto criminal law rules, which they took as the best exemplar
for promoting Islam's core values.160 For example, in their conception,
the laws of retaliation could help preserve life by limiting
opportunities for vigilante bloodshed and blood feuds of the type that
occurred in the pre-Islamic period.161 Apostasy laws could help
maintain Islamic religious identity, from a time when conversion
entailed a change in political loyalty.162 Prohibitions on intoxicants
16 3
Rules
could help preserve the dignity of individuals in public space.
honor-ties
against sex crimes could help preserve ties of lineage and
that the sources reveal to have been extremely important in medieval
Arab societies.164 And the laws against theft, fraud, highway robbery,
and the like promoted the sanctity of private property.' 6 5
With these values in mind, the import of huded crimes went far
beyond offenses against individual victims; they also infringed on the
sense of security and preservation of Islamic law's five core values.
Adultery is a telling example. Muslim jurists considered adultery less
an offense against the faithful spouse (i.e., a violation of a private
interest) than against the notion of open infidelity (i.e., a violation of
the public interest) in a system where marriage is the primary way to
make sexual relations licit.166 So concerned were jurists with avoiding
punishment when the public interest was left undisturbed, that they
tied their own hands in many cases that bore the harshest
punishments, like sex crimes. The legal texts forbid fornication and
adultery and a guilty verdict carried penalties ranging from flogging
to death; but the texts also establish stiff evidentiary requirements to
prove the offense-four eye-witnesses-thereby limiting the instances

commitments through natural law reasoning to justify rules that had no basis in
Qur'an or Sunna).
See GHAZALI, supra note 131; cf. AL-FAplL AL-MIQD D AL-SUYUlti, NAPD AL158.
QAWA'ID AL-FIQHIYYA 'ALL MADHIAB AL-IMAMIYYA 60-63 ('Abd al-Latif al-Kuhkamarl

Mahmaid al-Mar'ashi, 1983) (mentioning the five as nafs, drn, aql, nasab or 'irdi, and
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See, e.g., SUY(JRI, supra note 156, at 60-63.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62-63.
See Rabb, supranote 126, at 169-70.
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for finding badd liability. 167 Jurists further interpreted these texts to
severely circumscribe means of valid prosecution in other ways. As
noted, some limited the definition of fornication to the literal terms of
penetration between a man and a woman; every other case was
deemed doubt-ridden to a level sufficient to make the hudad maxim
apply to bar the sanction. 168 Some also determined that judges could
only impose punishment with uncoerced, multiple sworn confessions
or testimony from four witnesses to the act of penetration, who
offering uniform details of the time, manner, and place of the act. 169
Moreover, jurists encouraged sex offenders not to disclose their illicit
affairs,170 and they constructed an elaborate law of privacy designed
to prevent political authorities from prosecuting anything but brazen,
public sex acts.171 They instituted a host of additional evidentiary
safeguards as well, including rules restricting the acceptance of
confessions, disallowing verdicts based on judicial notice, and limiting
the use of circumstantial evidence.1 72
In other words, rudiid crimes like fornication or adultery were
punishable only when they were so public as to meet the most
stringent of standards of proof, thereby infringing on the public
values that the hudad prohibitions aimed to protect. Jurists applied
similar arguments to the range of hudad laws to articulate the moral
norms and public values at stake when each crime was committed.' 7 3

167.

Id.

168.

Id.

169.

See, e.g., ABU IBRAHIM ISMAIL B. YAHYA AL-MUZANi, 9 MUKHTASAR 276

(Husayn 'Abd al-Hamid Nil ed., 1993); Ibn Babawayh, Hidaya, in 23 SILSILAT YANABI
AL-FIQHIYYA 19 ('All Agghar Murwarid ed., 1990); MARGHINANI, 4 HIDAYA, supra note
145, at 129.
170.
E.g., IBRAHIM B. MuHAMMAD AL-BAJURI, HASHIYAT FATi AL-QARIB 384
(1974) ("[Wlhoever publicizes or makes known his sexual transgression incurs
[eligibility for] the hadd punishment."); ZAYLA'I, supra note 145, at 341-42 (arguing
that the law encourages sex crimes to be kept private (and essentially nonprosecutable), as four witnesses to the act would be exceedingly rare).
171.
See generally Eli Alshech, "Do Not Enter Houses Other Than Your Own"
The Evolution of the Notion of a Private Domestic Sphere in Early Sunn Islamic
Thought, 11 IsLAMic L. & Soc'y 291 (2004) (discussing conceptions of domestic privacy
in Islamic law). For a useful discussion of how Islamic privacy laws played out in
sodomy cases, see Seema Saifee, Note, Penumbras, Privacy, and the Death of MoralsBased Legislation: Comparing U.S. Constitutional Law with the Inherent Right of
Privacy in Islamic Jurisprudence, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 370, 446-48 (2003)
(comparing Islamic legal contexts with the rule announced in Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003)).
172.
E.g., IBN IDRIS AL-HILLI, 3 KITAB AL-SARAIR 537 (1989) (noting exceptions
to the Sunni bar on judicial determinations by private knowledge for offenses against
huqdq Allah); SHAMS AL-A'IMMA MUlAMMAD B. AHMAD AL-SARAKHSi, 9 MABSOT 43, 43106 (Abil 'Abd Allih Muhammad Hasan Ismil al-Shafi'i ed., 2001). For a basic
overview of criminal procedure, see PETERS, supra note 74, at 8-17, 79-92, 142-48
(detailing criminal procedure in classical Islamic doctrine, the pre-modern period, and
modern Islamic criminal law) and MAtlMASANI, supra note 78, at 325-76.
173.
See infra notes 196-207 and accompanying text.
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Some traditionalists even insisted that prohibitions offending no clear
private interest-so-called victimless crimes like intoxication lawswere not instituted for their own sake or any intrinsic moral value,
74
but primarily for the preservation of public order.1

A possible conceptual wrinkle in this public-private scheme
involved the laws of defamation, which Muslim jurists struggled to
smooth for several centuries.175 To many, a slanderous accusation
seemed more a private affront than a public one, which thus called
into question the classification of this hadd crime as a violation of
God's public rights. What public interest was threatened by the
intensely personal slight caused by defamation? Prior to the eleventh
century, sources. specified the punishment for defamation without
making huqaq classifications, as they were written before the huqiq
Allah-huqaq al-nds theory was fully elaborated. If anything, the
76
sources suggested that the offense was private.'
By the middle of the eleventh century, however, jurists had
developed a third category of "mixed claims" in which either God's
claims or private interests dominated.177 Through this new concept,
jurists aimed to overcome the inconsistency between the private
characteristics of defamation and the theory that all hudad laws fell
into the public huqaq Allah category.
Defamation proceedings typically worked in the following way: a
plaintiff initiated an indictment by petitioning the court, producing
evidence of the defamatory statement. 7 8 Punishment was then due
unless there was a fatal flaw in the evidence or the law otherwise
provided for mitigation.' 79 One mitigation provision involved disputed
80
effects of a plaintiffs decision to pardon the offender.1 Jurists
debated heatedly whether pardons of this type sufficed to avert the

E.g., WANSHARISI, supra note 145, at 683-84 (noting a Mliki view that the
174.
law does not prohibit wine drinking for its own sake, but aims to deter the harms to the
public sphere that accompany excessive drinking and addictive behavior).
See QUR'AN 24:4 (prohibiting false allegations of sexual impropriety and
175.
specifying eighty lashes as the fixed, mandatory sentence associated with proved
utterance of such defamatory statements). For prohibitions in the hadth literature, see
for example IBN ABT AL-QASIM, 4 AL-WAPIi F SHARH MUKHTASAR AL-KHIRAQI 421, 421-

22 ('Abd al-Malik b. 'Abd Allah b. Duhaysh ed., 2000) (citing a prophetic hadfth
instructing Muslims to "[a]void seven grave sins ... [including] and falsely accusing
unsuspecting, chaste, believing women").
176.
For instance, Shifi'! maintains that hudad laws were legislated for the
benefit of the plaintiff or victim. MUZANi, supra note 169, at 277 (citing Shifi'!'s later
opinion).
See, e.g., Hoexter, supra note 143, at 134; sources cited supra note 143.
177.
See Rabb, supra note 130, at *19.
178.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
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punishment.181 This debate turned on whether defamation was an
offense against private interests offending only the interests of the
addressee, or against public interests offending one of God's rights. If
private, plaintiff pardons should drop the punishment. If, on the
other hand, the crime was public, plaintiff pardons should have no
effect.182
Most jurists then applied this new category to defamation
proceedings in a way that further elucidated buded laws as "God's
rights" that were both public and moral offenses, yet recognized the
private nature of defamatory acts. As usual in Islamic law, jurists
generated a plurality of opinions about just how defamation fit into
the theory of hudad laws. The balance of private and public moved on
a sliding scale. Shafi'I jurists categorized defamation as almost
exclusively a private offense.' 83 Thus, they allowed hudid
punishments to drop with plaintiff pardons.184 But they required
some punishment to apply once the case was brought before a courtas a public tribunal-and proved.' 8 5 Maliki jurists outlined a similar
scheme, also asserting that private claims preponderate in defamation
cases. 186 Their approach allowed plaintiff pardon to drop the
punishment only if she desired to quash an indictment in order to
protect her reputation.' 8 7 But as with the Shafi'Is, MllikIs held that
once the indictment had reached the courts, the private nature of the

181.
Id.
182.
There are at least four ways that punishment could drop: (1) plaintiff
pardon or voluntary forfeiture of her right to bring a claim; (2) truth (tadTq), that is, if
the defendant can prove that the allegedly false statement was actually true; (3)
exculpatory evidence in the defendant's favor to show, for example, that the defendant
did not make the alleged statement; and (4) mutual imprecation, a process between
husband and wife whereby, in the face of suspicions or accusations of sexual
impropriety, each could be exonerated by both parties swearing four times that their
respective statements were true and a fifth time invoking the curse of God if they were
lying. See, e.g., MARI B. YOSUF AL-MAQDISI, DALIL AL-TALIB IIA NAYL AL-MUTALIB 'ALA
MADHHAB AL-IMAM AL-MUBAJJAL AHMAD B. HANBAL 254-55 ('Abd Alldh 'Umar alBaru-di ed., 1975); ZAYN AL-DIN IBN NUJAYM, 1 AL-ASHBAH WAL-NA7A'IR 188
(Muhammad Muti' al-Hafiz ed., 1983); AB. JA'FAR AHMAD AL-TAHAW!, MUKHTA$AR 266

(Abu al-Wafa' al-Afghani ed., 1950). A fifth, disputed means of dropping the hadd
punishment was repentance. See, e.g., MAWARDI, supra note 75, at 818 (Shafi'i jurist
challenging the mainstream Hanafi position that huddd punishments could not drop by
repentance).
183.
See Rabb, supra note 130, at *19-20.
184.

Id.

185.
See, e.g., MAWARDI, supra note 75, at 212-13 (classifying defamation under
buqtq al-'ibad). But see MAWARD!, supra note 103, at 433-34 (maintaining that the
state must impose some punishment for a defamation case proved before a tribunal
because of the huqaq al-Alldh element mandating punishing hudad offenses). Judges
could completely waive punishments only in limited circumstances, as when political
authorities made a policy decision that doing so was in the public interest. MAWARDi, 2
KITAB AL-HUDOD, supra note 75, at 1023-24.
186.
See Rabb, supra note 130, at *19-20.
187.
See id.
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claim actually transferred to the public sphere, and private pardon
could no longer have any legal effect.' 88
Hanafi jurists were most attentive to the public law aspects of
the offense. They classified defamation as falling either exclusively in
the divine claims category (in line with all other huddd crimes) or as
a mixed claim in which God's claims dominated. 8 9 Accordingly,
plaintiff pardon did not affect the mandatory nature of punishment
and was in fact deemed invalid.190 Leading ijanafi jurists justified
this position by explaining the public interests intrinsic to huded
laws. As a matter of God's claims, the public interest required the
state to strictly uphold these laws in order to prevent corruption in
society and protect the sanctity of individuals' personal security,
property, and reputational interests on a society-wide scale.191 In the
end, an individual could only defend her reputation (her private
interest) if she had some assurance that the state would enforce the
hudad laws (in the public interest). So, Hanafis concluded, defamation
laws were for all intents and purposes matter of public law.192
Hanbali jurists were the exception to the orientation that saw in
defamation public law relevance. They maintained that defamation
offends only individual interests.1 93 Accordingly, a badd sentence
could drop simply with a plaintiffs pardon. 9 4 Significantly, Hanball
jurisprudence reflects the traditionalist orientation of their school,
which never developed a notion of public-private rights that moved
beyond the early tradition-based theological conceptions of
obligations.

See ABO BAKR B. AL-'ARABI, 3 AHKAM AL-QURAN 344 (classifying
188.
defamation as an offense where huqciq al-'ibdd preponderates); IBN RUSHD II, supra
note 131, at 645-48 (same); AH-MAD B. YAHYA AL-WANSHARIST, 8 MI'YAR AL-MU'RIB
WA'L-JAMI' AL-MUGHRIB 'AN FATAWA AHL IFRTQIYA WAL-ANDALUS WAL-MAGHRIB 422
(Muhammad Hajji ed., 1981) (noting that the private huq~zq al-'ibdd aspects of

defamation become public huqrtq Allah concerns once a case enters the court as a public
tribunal).
See Rabb, supra note 130, at *23-27.
189.
See, e.g., ABOJ BAKR AL-KASAN1, 9 BADAT' AL-SANA'I' (Ahmad Mukhtar
190.
'Uthmin ed., 1968) 4212-13 (noting that the only real difference between defamation
and other hudad offenses implicating private-rather than divine-interests is that,
once established, defamation cannot be quashed by retraction of confession). But see
ZAYLAI, supra note 145, at 341 (observing Bazdawi's minority position to the contrary,
i.e., that defamation affects private interests).
191.
See Rabb, supra note 130, at *19-20.
192.
See, e.g., KASANi, supra note 190, at 4202-03 (analogizing defamation to
theft, which also affects individual interests but is treated as a crime of huqjiq Allah for
which punishment is mandatory because of the deterrent effect in the public sphere).
See supra note 190.
193.
194.

E.g., MAQDISI, supra note 182, at 254; see, e.g., IASAN B. AHMAD IBN AL-

BANNA', KITAB AL-MUQNI FT SHARH MUKHTASAR AL-KHIRAQl 1123 ('Abd al-'Aziz b.
Sulaymiin b. Ibrahim al-Ba'lni ed., 1993); MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN IBN QUDAMA, 12 ALMUGHNT 'ALA MUKHTASAR ABI AL-QASIM AL-KHIRAQI 277-78 ('Abd al-Muhsin al-Turki
& 'Abd al-Fattlih Muhammad al-Hulw eds., 1986).
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The mixed claims category advocated by most Islamic legal
schdols stuck. Through it, Muslim jurists successfully negotiated the
relationship between plaintiff pardon-which used to drop hadd
liability altogether-and the mandatory nature of hudad laws. Their
compromise was that the hadd punishment could drop by plaintiff
pardon so long as the matter remained between the two parties. Once
the matter reached the courts, the punishment could not drop. In
developing the mixed claims category of defamation, jurists
emphasized the public aspect of defamation as a moral offense-that
is, once in a public tribunal-for an act that was otherwise considered
private. They extended this same understanding in their approach to
other hudezd laws, balancing between public and private interests.
That is, they constructed a two-faceted sense of most hudad laws
under which punishment for hudad violations continued to be
mandatory, but only where they affected the public sphere.
The sources for pre-modern Islamic criminal law theory show the
public-private nature of the huqaq Allah-huqaq al-nds framework of
sex crimes and other hudad laws, and makes some sense of the high
evidentiary standards that otherwise seem so paradoxical.19 5 More
broadly, they show how jurists used criminal law to articulate Islam's
five core "objectives" with emphasis on the public sphere of their
times. This scheme reflected the core values of the societies from
which the jurists emerged and wrote in issuing their interpretations
of Islamic law.
3.

Giving Primacy to Private over Public, Individual over God

After the eleventh century developments in the concepts of public
versus private, there was one sense in which jurists continued to
maintain the mandatory nature of hudad laws through the earlier
theological-structural view of these laws as rules of obligation. But in
another sense, the jurists had articulated a public-moral theory of
hudad laws that grappled with the idea of individual interests within
the theological-structural framework. The hudad maxim could
accommodate both, and jurists used it to carve out exceptions to the
rule of mandatory enforcement.
Recall that the hudad maxim counsels jurists to "avoid criminal
sanctions in cases of doubt." 196 The jurists gave teeth to this
formulation by privileging the public-moral values that the hudcad
195.
Cf. LESLIE P. PIERCE, MORALITY TALES: LAW AND GENDER IN THE OTTOMAN
COURT OF AINTAB 353 (2003) ('"The rules of Islamic jurisprudence on bringing
accusation of zina were so strict that some scholars of these texts have assumed that
the courts would never see instances of adultery, fornication, or rape . . . . It is
therefore a paradox of Islamic jurisprudence that it set up obstacles to the enforcement
of the sexual probity it mandated.").
See supra notes 9, 76 and accompanying text.
196.
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laws were supposed to uphold, insofar as they gleaned them from the
Lawgiver, with respect to private and public interests. Avoiding the
Lawgiver's specific sanctions in favor of more general values sounds
counterintuitive, but it follows the logic of huded laws as deterrents
meant to champion public values.19 7
When a matter became so public that societal claims were at
stake and an accused defendant clearly had violated the law,
premodern Muslim jurists held that there was no individual harm
that the law must consider in their calculus of whether to apply
hudad sanctions.19 8 The Case of the Drunken Orphan in medieval
Islamic Iraq demonstrates the point.19 9 A man came to the judge Ibn
Mas'ild with his drunken nephew asking that the boy be punished for
being a drunkard.2 00 Protesting but apparently confessing to the
charge, the young man accused his uncle of being the worst
guardian. 201 "You neither disciplined me nor covered my sin!" he
censured, alluding to the general encouragement to avoid bringing
criminal acts into the public sphere. 202 The judge ruled that, while
"God is (quick to) pardon and loves pardon," a judge must impose the
appropriate punishment for a hadd violation once it is raised in court
and proved. 203 He imposed the punishment for drunkenness, forty
lashes, because the matter had become one of public record, the
offense was proved, and lack of self-discipline was not a valid excuse
for avoiding enforcement of the hadd punishment.2 0 4
By contrast, doubts or ambiguities in the law or the evidence
could raise questions about individual culpability, which in turn
would raise questions about the validity of punishing an individual
whose conduct was only dubiously criminal or who was only
dubiously liable. In other words, prosecution in such doubtful cases
would run the risk of violating an individual's personal entitlement to
be free from harm when he is not in fact criminally culpable. For
example, in another case in medieval Syria, a petitioner brought a
theft complaint against a man whom he found with his belongings
that he alleged had been stolen from him. 205 The judge suggested that

197.
See, e.g., MUHAMMAD B. IDRIS AL-SHAFiI, 8 UMM 288 (Mahmaid al-Mutraji
ed., 1993) (describing two purposes of hudad laws as (1) severe punishments designed
to deter crime, and (2) spiritual purification or rehabilitation); MAWARDI, supra note
75, at 99 ("Hudiid are punishments by which God deters people from committing
prohibited [acts] and encourages them to follow [His] commands.").
198.
See, e.g., Rabb, supra note 126, at 248 n.45.
199.
See BAYHAQI, supra note 80, no. 17391.
Id.
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Id.
204.
205.
See WAl, supranote 85, at 617 (detailing the case presided over by Fadala
b. 'Ubayd al-An$5rl).
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the defendant had merely happened upon the stolen goods, and
although appearances made it seem that the defendant had stolen
them, there was no clear proof that he did. 206 The judge was wary of
imposing the hadd punishment for theft and released the defendant
because he feared infringing on the accused's interests in a case
where a theft had occurred, but had not occurred so publicly or
certainly traceable to the defendant that it warranted imposition of
budad laws.207
As it turns out, the budad maxim barred budad sanctions when
there was ambiguity about which "public rights" were at stake, but
operated less expansively when "private rights" were at stake. 208 In
other words, whenever the more specific private interest was placed
against the non-specific public interest, the private interest always
took the upper hand. In this way, judges avoided impinging on the
individual "rights" to life, religion, dignity, honor, and property that
they saw the law to be designed first and foremost to uphold.
Muslim jurists of the time further explained the hudad maxim in
equitable terms when describing how it applies to a conflict of textsone permitting an act, the other prohibiting it and attaching criminal
consequences. These types of cases are described in further detail
below, as they involve issues of interpretive ambiguity as it relates to
fair notice concerns. For now, suffice it to say that scholars invoked
the hudad maxim with respect to equitable principles delineated in
such instances as well. For example, one scholar explained that the
hudad maxim "takes precedence . . . because the greater interest (of
the law) is in preservation of life." 209 Moreover, he added, "hudad
(sanctions) are harsh; they must not be enforced unless there is a
complete crime proved."210 In other words, leading jurists maintained
that the value placed on private interests and the high stakes of a
hudad conviction required "hudad laws to be construed with
'lenity.'211
The point, jurists intimated, was not to impose the huded
sanctions as much as possible. In fact, an oft-quoted version of the
hudad maxim advised the exact opposite: "Avoid imposing hudad
punishments on Muslims as much as you can; if there is an
exculpating cause for [the accused], then release him, as it is better
that the Imim make a mistake in pardoning than in punishing."2 12
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
Rabb, supra note 126, at 173.
208.
Izz AL-DIN IBN 'ABD AL-SALAM, 2 AL-QAWAID AL-KUBRA 279-80 (Nazih
209.
Kamal Hammad & 'Uthmlin Jumu'a Damiriyya eds., 2007) (giving an example of a
marriage of disputed validity).
Id. (emphasis added).
210.
211.
E.g., WANsHARISI, supra note 145, at 683-84 ('ald l-ta'dtf al-mutlaq).
212.
See, e.g., BAYHAQI, supra note 80, nos. 17057-58; ABOJ BAKR IBN ABI
SHAYBA, 9 MUSANNAF 360, no. 28972 (Muhammad b. Ibrahim al-Lhidfin & Hamad b.
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Accordingly, jurists maintained that the fundamental impetus behind
Islam's criminal law system was to use the threat of hudad sanctions
to deter and punish proved criminal offenses, but to use the hudad
maxim equitably to uphold the law's fundamental values, which gave
primacy to individual private interests when there was no clear
threat to the public sphere.
B. FairnessRationales
In addition to using it as a tool for equitable readings, Muslim
jurists of the early period also used the hudad maxim to promote
values of fair notice. One way of making certain that offenders were
fairly punished was to read a mens rea requirement into the law, as
jurists of the English common law would later come to do. 213 Another
way of ensuring fair notice was to articulate a theory of ambiguity
that accounted for the fluid nature of Islamic legal texts, for as we
have seen, it was often difficult for jurists to agree on the contours of
even hudld laws as specimens of clear statements of law.214 Muslim
jurists used the huded maxim to pursue both strategies. For them,
the maxim meant that hudad sanctions applied only if it could be
proven that a defendant had intentionally violated a clear law. 215
Accordingly, the huded maxim applied easily to laws that, at least
from a jurist's perspective, were objectively ambiguous. Jurists also
used the maxim to count reasonable mistake of law, ignorance, and
mistake of fact claims as the type of doubt-from the individual
offender's perspective-serious enough to bar punishment. 21 6
1. A Broad Theory of Doubt: Legal Pluralism and Interpretive
Ambiguity
Islamic law notions of clarity and ambiguity outline a wide range
to account both for the fluid nature of Islamic legal texts and the

'Abd Allah al-Jumu'a eds., 2004) (same); 'ABD AL-RAZZAQ AL-$AN'ANi, 10 MUSANNAF
166, no.18698 (Ayman Naer al-Din al-Azhari ed., 2000) (same); MUUAMMAD B. 'ISA ALTIRMIDHi, 5 SUNAN 112-13 no. 1424 (1965-1969) (same).
213.
See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978)
("[Tihe familiar proposition that 'existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the
exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence."') (citations
omitted); Morissette v.,United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) ("The contention that
an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or
transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual
to choose between good and evil.").
214.
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
Rabb, supra note 77, at 68.
215.
See Rabb, supra note 126, at 263-90, 293-300.
216.
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multiple schools of interpretation that help to define those texts.
Typically, textual ambiguity covers situations where the law is silent
as to the legality of particular acts, or where there is a conflict of
texts.217 A good example concerns male sodomy, which was an
especially thick bone of contention between the Hanafi and Shafi'I
schools.21 8 The Hanafis argued that the Qur'an specified a
punishment for zind (male-female sex acts outside of marriage) but
was silent on sodomy. 2 19 Thus by definition, they maintained that
sodomy could not be a hadd crime. 220 But the Shafi'is disagreed on
the basis that the Qur'an equated zind to any gravely immoral act
and thus mandated punishment or homosexual sodomy, or
alternatively, that the word zind encompassed male-male sexual
interactions as well as male-female sex offenses. 221 Whereas Shafi'is
saw clarity, Hanafis saw ambiguity, and their doubt was enough to
take sodomy out of the realm of hudad laws. 222
In this debate, the jurists focused on the scope of identifiable,
agreed-upon Qur'inic texts that clearly forbade zind but were silent
or needed construction to extend to acts of sodomy. 223 Instances of
ambiguity increased in the realm of hadTths, where jurists could
rarely point to agreed-upon authoritative texts. Islamic law has a

In general, Muslim jurists regarded legal texts to be ambiguous when
217.
statements of general import engendered uncertainty as to whether and how the law
regulated a new set of facts. This may occur when the law was silent, the scope of an
existing and possibly related ruling was insufficiently clear, or where there were actual
conflicts between two texts commanding two contradictory rulings. MUSTAFA
MUHAQQIQ DAMAD, 4 QAVA'rD-I FIQH 54 (1999).
For general legal treatments of sodomy in Islam, see CHRISTIAN LANGE,
218.
JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, AND THE MEDIEVAL MUSLIM IMAGINATION 199-214 (2008);
KHALED EL-ROUAYHEB, BEFORE HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE ARAB-ISLAMIC WORLD, 15001800, at 118-28 (2005); Arno Schmitt, Liwat im Fiqh: Mannliche Homosexualitat, 4 J.
ARABIC & ISLAMIC STUDS. 49-110 (2001-2002).
219.
See ABU AL-HUSAYN AL-QUDURI, 11 TAJRID 5910-16 (Muhammad Ahmad alSirlij & 'Al Jumu'a Muhammad eds., 2004).
Id.
220.
See GHAZALi, supra note 131, at 440; ABC AL-QASIM AL-RAFIT, AL-'AZIZ
221.
SHARH AL-WAJIZ 139-41 (All Muhammad Mu'awwad & 'Adil Ahmad 'Abd al-Mawjid
eds., 1997); YAtIYA B. SHARAF AL-NAWAW!, RAWIAT AL-TALIBIN 309 (Al Muhammad
Mu'awwad & 'Adil Ahmad 'Abd al-Mawjild eds., 1992).
For detailed Hanafi responses to ShafiT arguments in favor of counting
222.
sodomy as a hadd, see QUDURI, supra note 219, at 5910-16. Worth noting is that,
though Hanafis generally dropped the hadd punishments, most regarded public male
sodomy as immoral and thus punishable at the discretion of the caliph. See ZAYN ALDIN IBN NUJAYM, 5 AL-BAHR AL-RA'IQ 17 (1893).
223.
ShiT law did not face the problem of ambiguous texts in its unequivocal
prohibition of zind; it cited a body of hadrths, consensus, and rational argumentation to
the effect that if zina was forbidden and had a hadd punishment, sodomy-which they
regarded as a graver moral offense-should be punished even more harshly). See, e.g.,
ABJ JAFAR AL-TfJSI, 2 AL-NIHAYA F! MUJARRAD AL-FIQH WA'L-FATAWA 723-24 (1963);
al-Sharif al-Murtada, Intisor, in 23 SILSILAT YANABi' AL-FIQHIYYA 49-50 (All Agghar
Murwlrid ed., 1990); Muhammad b. Nu'min al-Mufid, Muqni a, in 23 SILSILAT
YANABI AL-FIQHIYYA 3 ('All Asghar Murwirld ed., 1990).
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problem of sources: in the realm of hadrth there was much
disagreement about which texts were authoritative and normative
bases for law. 224 Even when the textual source-critics accepted the
authenticity of hadfth, there was disagreement as to how jurists
ought to resolve conflicts between them. 225 Without a unified
authoritative corpus of hadith or a single code of law, each school of
law addressed such questions through elaborate rules of
interpretation particular to their own hermeneutical principles that
they thought remained most faithful to the constitutional texts.
In this context, Sunni jurists saw ambiguity in the very
226
interpretive differences about the law between the legal schools.
This category of "interpretive ambiguity" underscores the extent to
which these jurists viewed Islamic law as a juristic construct that
accommodates a generous notion of legal pluralism: any rule that is
valid in one Sunni school is to be recognized as a valid legal rule. 227
In that vein, they sought to distinguish areas subject to extensive
interpretation and debate. For them, Islamic law fell into two
categories-clearly established rules and debatable rules. 228
Clearly established rules are law so widespread that they can be
presumed to be a matter of common knowledge in a given society or
legal regime.2 29 Everyone in a Muslim society should know, for
example, that Islamic law prohibits sex outside of marriage. 230 In the
earliest moments of the Muslim community, it was possible for new
converts to claim that they were unaware of this prohibition, as
occurred in a case during the time of the second caliph, 'Umar. The
caliph ruled that a Yemeni man who committed a sex crime but

224.
See Mottahedeh, supra note 66, at 10-13.
Id.
225.
226.
This is a doctrine adopted by the Shafi'T and Maliki schools. Whereas for
Milikis, the fact of juristic disagreement on matters well-established in another school
is enough to give rise to a hadd-averting doubt, the ShafiI recognition is qualified. To
recognize rules that go against their school's mainstream positions, Shafi's require a
firm legal basis that would meet muster according their interpretive methods. That is,
if a ShafiT jurist examined the legal sources relied upon by other jurists for divergent
opinions, he need only recognize them as valid if those conclusions rest on logic so
convincing that they suggest themselves easily to an astute Shafii jurist's mind. See,
e.g., ABO AL-FAYP AL-MAKKI 2 AL-FAwAID AL-JANIYYA HASHIYAT AL-MAWAHIM ALSANIYYA SHARH AL-FAWKID AL-BAHIYYA, 133-34 (Ramzi Sa'd al-Din al-Dimashqi ed.,

1991); IBN 'ABD AL- SALAM, supra note 209, at 279-80.
227.
See SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW

AND

THE

STATE:

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI 142 (1996) (quoting the

definition of legal pluralism advanced by thirteenth-century Egyptian jurist Shihib alDin al-Qarifi: "the ability to countenance the plurality of equally authoritative legal
interpretations").
228.
E.g., QARAFI, supra note 150, at 1309 (noting that the first category means
presumed, not actual, knowledge-as indicated by its label, masklhar, meaning
widespread or common).
Id.
229.
230.
Id.
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claimed not to know that it was illegal was eligible for the hadd
punishment only if he knew that the act was prohibited.2 3 1 The
implication is that the man's lack of awareness was plausible, as
Yemen was on the margins of the community at a time when Islamic
laws were not widespread. 232 Some jurists took 'Umar's ruling as the
basis for a mens rea requirement, which coincided with their
understandings of the hudad maxim. 233 But more generally, jurists
determined that Islamic law's clear prohibitions against zind very
quickly became sufficiently widespread that they fell into the
category of clearly established rules. 234 Thus, a thirteenth century
jurist ruled that a couple claiming confusion about the legality of sex
before marriage when they planned to get married did not constitute
the type of ambiguity that would avert a hadd punishment; the
prohibition against extra-marital sex had already been clearly
established. 2 35 In this area of clearly established rules, courts did not
generally entertain claims of ambiguity. 236
"Debatable rules" refers to the detailed technical rules that have
been the subject of juristic differences and comprise most of Islamic
law. "Only astute jurists can discern these rules," one jurist
explained, and even then, they often disagree.23 7 Muslim jurists have
always acknowledged the probabilistic nature of the interpretive
endeavor and tried to account for it in various ways.2 38 In criminal
law, a central way of doing this was through the elaboration of the

See IBN NUJAYM, supra note 222, at 4.
231.
Id. The implication is that the ability to claim hadd-averting doubt by way
232.
of ignorance about zind prohibitions was limited to the first generations; Islamic
prohibitions against zind very quickly became sufficiently widespread that they fell
into the category of clearly established rules. See also IBN QUDAMA, supra note 194, at
345; cf. PAUL R. POWERS, INTENT IN IsLAMIc LAW: MOTIVE AND MEANING IN MEDIEVAL
SUNNi FIQH 193-94 (2006) (discussing how shubha presents a problematic legal
principle, as it in effect means "the law only applies to those who have knowledge of the
law").
233.
Prominent Hanafi jurists, including Ibn Mizah, 'Ayni, and Ibn 'Abidin,
imposed a knowledge requirement for zind-liability based on 'Umar's judgment, with
Ibn 'Abidin specifying that to impose a hadd would contravene the requirements of the
hudad maxim. But other prominent Hanafis rejected this view, holding that claims of
ignorance were never appropriate in cases of sex offenses because all religions and
communities had outlawed it. Ibn Nujaym took a strict-liability approach, holding that
huded punishments applied whenever hudad laws were violated, regardless of
publication of the law or the offender's knowledge. For competing positions, see IBN
NUJAYM, supra note 222, at 4.
See IBN QUDAMA, supra note 194, at 345.
234.
QARAFi, supranote 150, at 1309.
235.
Rabb, supra note 126, at 306.
236.
QARAFi, supranote 150, at 1309.
237.
238.
This insight is the major contribution of Aron Zysow, Economy of Certainty
90-91, 459-62 (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file
with Harvard University Library Archives).
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hudud maxim and an accompanying doctrine of doubt.23 9 . Here,
textual ambiguity to jurists means non-liability for the average
person, and jurists imposed a high burden of clarity before allowing
criminal liability. 240 In other words, if even jurists could reasonably
disagree about the substance of the law, then "ignorance is an excuse
(for the layperson)." 241
Consider the interpretive difference concerning valid forms of
marriage. Islamic law initially allowed "temporary marriages," which
Sunni schools later deemed illegal. 242 These are marriage contracts
wherein the couple specifies a date upon which the union will dissolve
automatically, without divorce proceedings. 243 Jurists agreed that the
Prophet permitted this form of marriage during his lifetime, but
244
disagreed as to whether the practice was subsequently outlawed.
Sunni jurists concluded it was outlawed, but there is evidence that
temporary marriages continued well into the first century, indicating
that any prohibition must have occurred through some means beyond
the ordinary foundational sources. 245 Nevertheless, the Sunni jurists
came to a consensus by the mid-eighth century that temporary
marriages were unlawful.
The disputed status of this form of marriage could have stiff
consequences in criminal law because sexual relations in an invalid
marriage opens parties up to criminal liability for zinad-where
penalties range from flogging to death. 246 Jurists invoked the hudcd
maxim in such cases on the notion that, to impose criminal sanctions
given the interpretive ambiguity about the legal status of temporary
marriages would amount to not giving fair notice to non-jurists who
entered into such contracts. 247 Most jurists announced a general rule
that any law deemed valid in one school would be construed as an
ambiguity that absolves the accused of possible criminal liability in

JALliL AL-DIN AL-SUYUJTI, AL-ASHBILH WA'L-NA7.AIR 237 (Muhammad al239.
Mu'tasim bi'llih al-Baghdadi, 1998) (defining doubt as interpretive differences, which
produce rules that "are legal according to some jurists but illegal according to others".
QARikFi, supra note 150, at 1309.
240.
Id. (emphasis added).
241.
The Meccan School of Ibn 'Abblis sanctioned it, as did the proto-Shi'a in
242.
Medina and Kilfa. See Wilferd Madelung, Abd Alldh IbAn Abbas and Shrite Law, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE UNION EUROPtENNE DES
ARABISANTS ET ISLAMISANTS: LAW, CHRISTIANITY AND MODERNISM IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY
15-16, 23-25 (1998).
Id.
243.
Id.
244.
Id.
245.
See PETERS, supra note 74, at 59-62 (detailing the range of punishments
246.
imposed for zini under different schools of thought).
247.
Rabb, supra note 126, at 308.
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another. 248 To do otherwise would be to impose criminal liability
where the perpetrator did not have clear notice that his actions were
proscribed, in an area where even the jurists could not agree on the
meaning of the law.
2.

Mistake of Law or Ignorance Can Be an Excuse

Mistake of law covers cases where the law is clear (to the jurist)
but confused in the mind of the layperson. 249 The reasonableness of
the mistake differs by school, along with the requirements that
jurists impose for exercising due diligence to ascertain the law before
claiming mistake or ignorance.2 50 But most insisted that to be
reasonable, a person must have had some textual basis for thinking
that an act was legal that was actually illegal. 251 Such circumstances
usually arose in cases of apparent conflicts of texts. An oft-repeated
example in the sources was the case of a father taking his son's
property on the mistaken belief that he was entitled to do so. The
texts are clear, as the jurists understood them, that he had no such
entitlement. 252 Yet, a prophetic statement to the effect that "a son
and his property belong to (or are under the care of) his father" could
provide a basis for a father's belief-albeit mistaken-that it is
perfectly legal to take his son's property. 253 In such cases, where the
father lacked both knowledge of the actual law and criminal intent to

248.
E.g., QARAFI, supra note 150, at 1307 (applying the hudad maxim to a
disputed types of marriage that Hanafis validate in which a woman gets married
without the permission of her guardian).
249.
See, e.g., IBN NUJAYM, supra note 182, at 128.
250.
Hanafis imposed very thin diligence duties, finding ambiguity where a
person had a reasonable basis for believing that an illegal act is legal, and applying the
huddd maxim to drop the associated punishment. In such instances, to be reasonable,
the belief had to have simply rested upon some textual basis, even if all jurists agreed
that the individual interpretation was incorrect. See, e.g., QUDfIRi supra note 219, at
5899-900 (describing duties of due diligence before the maxim applies). Shifi'Is and
Malikis similarly required a textual basis, but counted rules arising from interpretive
disputes amongst jurists as texts. See, e.g., QARAFI, supra note 150, at 1307-09; IBN
'ABD AL-SALAM, supra note 209, at 279-80. Shi'i jurists sharply distinguished between
objective ambiguity (in the mind of the jurists) and subjective ambiguity (in the mind of
individual legal agents), placing emphasis on the former for legal recognition in
invoking the hudild maxim and applying thick standards of diligence on the latter. See
MUHAQQIQ DAMAD, supra note 217, at 54-61; MUHAMMAD AL-FApIL AL-LANKARANi, ALQAWA'ID AL-FIQHIYYA 21 (1995).
251.
For an example in Maliki law, see for example IBN RUSHD II, supra note
131, at 261-62.
252.
Id.
253.
For discussions in the legal literature with citations to this hadfth (anta
wa-mdluk li-abrk), see AHMAD B. HANBAL, 2 MUSNAD nos. 179, 204, 214 ('Abd Allih alDarwish) (hadfth citation); IBN NUJAYM, supra note 222, at 13 (Hanafi discussion);
QARAF, supra note 148, at 1309 (Mliki discussion); SUYDJTi, supra note 239, at 237
(Shdfi'i discussion); IBN IDRIS, supra note 172, at 486 (Shii discussion).
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violate the law, and instead relied on his mistaken belief of legality,
jurists applied the hudad maxim to avert the hadd punishment for
theft. 2 54
Mere ignorance of the law could also be an excuse, as we saw in
the case of the Yemeni Muslim convert living on the periphery of the
central Muslim lands, who escaped hadd liability for a sex crime by
claiming not to know it was illegal. For Sunni jurists, the
accommodation of ignorance was pragmatic and equitable. As one
jurist put it, the hudad maxim meant that judges should entertain
claims of ignorance in areas of debatable rules, because the law was
often too complex to expect that a layperson could or would be aware
of its details. 255 Where even jurists could not agree as to the contours
of the law, there was ambiguity, and it would be unfair to punish
individuals for violating ambiguous rules. 256 For Shi'i jurists, who did
not recognize interpretive ambiguity in the Sunni system of multipleschool pluralism, applying the budad maxim on the basis of claims of
ignorance is also an acknowledgement that there will be cases where
even expert jurists cannot ascertain the law. They too maintained
that it would be unfair to punish an individual offender where he
simply had no notice of the law after exercising duly diligent attempts
to ascertain it.2 5 7
These same jurists of course took pains not to allow this principle
to translate into complete disregard of the law, by evaluating the
individual claims of ignorance for plausibility.25 8 A criminal offense
committed out of ignorance meant that the individual lacked the
requisite intent to be charged with criminal culpability. 259 Jurists
thus added that the maxim should apply to reasonable claims of
ignorance.

254.
See supra note 250.
255.
QARAFI, supra note 150, at 1309.
256.
Id.
257.
Shi'i jurists distinguished between the person who is ignorant of the law
but has made a good faith effort to ascertain it, and the one who has made no such
effort. Only those who made a good faith effort or who lived far away from the centers
of knowledge would have a bona fide claim of ignorance that would avert punishment
for commission of the hadd crime. Others who could have asked an expert (mujtahid)
but failed to do so out of willful blindness are deemed negligent, especially when acting
in questionable areas that might implicate criminal liability; they are taken to have
constructive notice of the law. See MUHAQQIQ DAMAD, supra note 217, at 54-55, 57.
258.
See, e.g., IBN RUSHD II, supra note 131, at 262-33 (listing cases where the
hudad maxim does not apply because there has in fact been no reliance on a legal
ambiguity; that is, where the offender knew he was violating the law, and thus could
not claim ignorance).
259.
See, e.g., MAKKI, supra note 226, at 137 (Sh5fi'I statement); QARAFI, supra
note 150, at 1307 (MilikI statement).
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Mistake of Fact Can also Be an Excuse

As for mistake of fact, consider this example. 260 Islamic law
unambiguously prohibits wine consumption. 261 What happens if a
person finds a reddish liquid in front of her? If she has strong reason
to believe that the liquid is juice rather than wine, even if she is
mistaken, the maxim applies and no punishment is due. 262 But if she
is unsure what the liquid is, the maxim does not apply until and
unless she has made diligent attempts to ascertain what the beverage
is. 263 Here too, there is no sinful or criminal intent; the mistake
creates a doubt of the type to which the maxim applies to bar
punishment. 264
C. Fault Lines: Strict Liability and Public-Moral Values
Ambiguity did not always produce the benefit of budad
avoidance. Jurists of some schools argued in favor of strict liability for
certain crimes, where the values at stake were so fundamental, they
argued, that the hudild maxim could not apply. In such cases, they
advocated punishment regardless of mistake or lack of notice.
Typically, these instances dove-tailed with clearly established rules,
which tended to manifest the Muslim community's closely held moral
values and social norms.
1.

Consensus Cases of Strict Liability

Jurists agreed that the budad maxim would not apply to absolve
liability from perpetrators of proved instances of rape. 265 They
indicated that no amount of claimed ignorance of the law could avert
hadd liability from the perpetrator because of the gravity and the
immorality of the crime and its violation of the private interests of
the victim. 266 The inverse was also true: the hudad maxim did apply

260.
Factual uncertainty arises when an individual is unaware that a known
legal rule applies to a particular set of facts. See MUHAQQIQ DAMAD, supra note 217, at
55. But in some instances, factual uncertainty may give rise to legal uncertainty as
well. For example, when the law imposes a duty only if certain conditions are met,
uncertainty as to whether the condition has been realized engenders uncertainty as to
whether the law imposes a duty in the first place. See MUIAMMAD BAQIR AL-SADR,
DURuS F1 'ILM AL-USUL 386-88 (1998).
261.
See QUR'AN 5:90.
262.
See, e.g., QUDURI, supra note 219, at 5899 (Ijanafi positions); QARAFI, supra
note 150, at 3107 (Miliki positions); GHAZAL!, supranote 131, at 444 (Shifi'i positions).
263.
See supra note 260.
264.
IBN 'ABD AL-SALAM, supranote 209, at 279.
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to the rape victim, as the lack of voluntariness was conceived as a
hadd-averting doubt akin to the lack of mens rea.267 During the reign
of the second caliph, 'Umar averted the hadd sanction from a woman
accused of zind who claimed to have been sleeping and awoke to find
a man atop her.26 8 He determined the case to be one of rape, which
lifted criminal culpability from the woman and imposed it strictly on
the man (though the man was no longer to be found). 269 In the same
way, jurists drew a red line around rape as a crime of strict liability.
The prohibition against it was a well-established rule that all legal
agents were presumed aware of and charged with respecting. Thus,
jurists rejected any room for applying the hudad maxim in these
cases.
2.

Against Contracting Ambiguity

Most jurists also imposed a rule of strict liability on couples who
were legally forbidden from marrying each other-such as siblingsbut did so anyway. 270 The founder of the Hanafi school, Abi Hanifa,
attempted to counter that rule by proposing another type of doubt:
contractual ambiguity. He held that legal permissions ordinarily
flowing from a valid contract created a hadd-averting doubt when a
contract was materially defective. 271 He applied this rule even where
contracting parties entered into a contract knowing of the material
defect. 272 Whereas other jurists saw such marriage contracts as void,
Abii Hanifa saw them as voidable; for him, they created at least the
semblance of a contract. 273

Jurists uniformly avoided the hadd penalty when it came to rape victims,
265.
on the basis of the hadrth in which the Prophet reportedly said that members of his
community are not liable for matters arising from coercion. See IBN QUDAMA, supra
note 194, at 347-48 (citing the Sunni version of the hadth: "My community is not liable
for [consequences arising from] mistake, forgetfulness, or coercion."); AL-WAHID ALBIHBAHANi, AL-RASA'IL AL-UfJLIYYA 354 (1996) (citing the ShiI version of the hadfth:
"My community is not liable in nine situations ... [among them], mistake,
forgetfulness, coercion, ignorance, and incapacity."); MURTApA AL-ANSARI, AL-RASA'IL
AL-JADIDA WA'L-FARA'ID AL-HADITHA 154 ('All Mishkini al-Ardabili ed., 1971) (same).
See infra note 270.
266.
IBN QUDAMA, supra note 194, at 347.
267.
QUDtJRi, supra note 219, at 5908-09.
268.
269.
Id.
Many dispense with a mens rea requirement here, indicating the moral
270.
value they place on this rule. See IBN QUDAMA, supra note 194, at 341 (citing latesecond- to mid-third-century jurists AbQi Yilsuf, Muhammad al-Shaybani, Isb5q Ibn
Rdhawayh, and others for the rule).
See IBN NUJAYM, supra note 182, at 128.
271.
272.
Id.
Ordinarily, the Islamic law of contract provides some protection for
273.
defective commercial transactions pursued on the mistaken belief that they were done
under color of a contract, that is, where there was a semblance of a valid contract. Abai
Hanifa extended this norm to marriage law in his position that the semblance of a
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This example illustrates how, in I;anafi law, a single case could
have two aspects-one criminal and the other commercial-and is
thus governed by two sets of laws with differing legal outcomes. The
commercial aspect validates such relations whenever there is a
contract, or, according to Abfi Hanifa, the semblance of one. 2 74 In such
cases, Abfi Hanifa privileged contract law, using it to find semblances
that he could then equate the legal doubt necessary to avoid
punishment in criminal law. The effect was to avert the hadd
punishment in all cases involving contracts, however knowingly
defective.2 75 Yet, this effort to privilege the law of contract over other
values ultimately failed. Most jurists, even subsequent HIanafis of
Abi Hanifa's own school, rejected his arguments. 276 For them,
adjudication on the mere basis of the sanctity of private agreements
had to fit within, rather than override, Islamic law's overarching
fundamental values. Most jurists found the value Abu Hanifa placed
on private property insufficiently compelling to trump competing
family values.
3.

Expressing Values: Structure and Substance

This examination of hudad laws has uncovered some of the value
commitments articulated by Muslim jurists. Though the Islamic
approach to criminal law interpretation displays significant
similarities to the Anglo-American tradition (especially in the broad
commitments to fairness and equity), my goal is not to equate the
content of those value commitments. Rather, the aim is to identify
ways in which hudad laws operated with respect to a complex set of
public-moral values in the Islamic context and what that might say

marriage contract should provide protection as well, in this case, exculpating parties
from accusations of zind. See id. at 128.
See, e.g., AL-'ALIM B. AL-'ALA AL-AN$ARi, 5 AL-FATAWA AL-TATARKHANIYYA
274.
108-16 (Sajjiid Husayn ed., 1990) (discussing the differences in the chapters on
commercial law and the chapters on criminal law).
Further examples of instances in which Ab5lHanifa barred punishment
275.
despite clear Islamic legal prohibitions against certain acts, include the following:
sexual relations with a slavewoman held as security and contracts for the sale of wine.
See, e.g., MUuAMMAD AMiN IBN 'ABIDIN, 12 AL-RADD AL-MUHTAR 'ALA 'L-DURR ALMUKHTAR 61-84 (All Muhammad Mulawwao & 'Adil Ahmad 'Abd al-Mawjiid eds.,
1994-1998); QAPi KHAN AL-UZJANDi, 3 FATAWA 480-89 (Salim Mustafa- al-Badri ed.,
2009); ANSARi, supra note 274, at 108-16; IBN NUJAYM, supra note 222, at 16.
276.
Only a minority of later Hanafis followed Ab5i Hanifa's views of "contractual
doubt," often implicitly. Examples include QUDJRI, supra note 219, at 5901-07
(implicit definition) and KASAN, supra note 190, at 4150 (explicit definitions). Many
Hanafis, beginning with Abu H.anifa's two most prominent students, Abii Yaisuf and
Shaybdlni, objected. See IBN NUJAYM, supra note 182, at 128 (noting disagreement with
Abia Hanifa's rule of hadd-avoidance by claiming reliance on a contractual ambiguity
despite knowledge of the identity of the prohibited partner and the illegality of the
marriage).
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about the law's value commitments and related interpretative
scheme. To that end, the study also revealed interpretative processes
at the core of Islamic criminal law, showing how jurists worked out
the theories of criminal law through discussions and applications of
the huded maxim-"the Islamic rule of lenity."
In the process, it should have become apparent that premodern
Muslim jurists formally saw themselves bound to the dictates of a
divine Lawgiver through foundational legal texts, with an absolute
form of legislative supremacy and constrained judicial discretion in
criminal law. At the same time, in applications of the law on the
ground, these same jurists applied equitable principles based on
overarching public-moral values also contained in the Lawgiver's
foundational texts. Though they tended toward opposite outcomes,
both maneuvers were efforts to vindicate an idea of absolute
legislative supremacy. Jurists took the theoretical mandatoriness of
the hudad law regime outlined in constitutional texts to underscore
the set of moral values on which they focused in actual application.
With this in mind, they deployed the hudad maxim not quite as an
exception to criminal law rules, but as a corollary, rooted in
provisions from Islamic legal precepts in the constitutional texts
requiring fairness and equity.

V. CONCLUSION
These interpretive processes-as revealed not only in texts but
also in the way jurists deployed lenity on the ground-carry profound
implications for understanding legal processes in Islamic and
American law. In the Islamic legal process, the huddd maxim reveals
much about the institutional structure and core values underlying
the legal system called sharrfa as it operated historically. The maxim
also discloses the presence of equity and limits on judicial restraint
placed on Muslim jurists wielding interpretative authority over the
law. In that context, legislative supremacy took on a meaning
qualified by the core values affecting the extent to which judges
superimposed equity concerns onto textual interpretations otherwise
bound to rules of legislative supremacy. The lack of separated powers
or formal legislators beyond the initial Lawgiver explains jurists'
emphasis on values expressed in foundational texts. It also explains
the centrality of jurists to legal interpretation and adjudication in the
context of Islam's multiple legal schools. In that vein, their inability
to update the law formally manifested in a reliance on legal canons
like lenity to define law and guide discretion in a vastly expanded
judicial role.
Contrast this with the lenity rule in the American legal
tradition. It too reveals core aspects of constitutional structures and
values undergirding American legal theory. In American legal

1350

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL, 44:1299

process, the lenity rule appears a bellwether for how individual
judges understand the Judicial Power. For textualist judges, like
Justice Scalia, using lenity as a principle of equity is illegitimate
because it compromises strong rules of legislative supremacy and
judicial deference in criminal law. Indeed, for him and other lenity
proponents, equity need not enter the equation directly; textualism
and judicial deference is enough. Where lenity must act as a
constraint on judicial discretion, benefits may accrue to criminal
defendants coincidentally to the motivating force behind the rule.
Use of American lenity in that respect is quite opposite its use and
effect in the Islamic legal context-despite shar a's more robust
insistence on absolute legislative supremacy.
This historical and comparative study of lenity significantly
informs our understandings of public law theory governing
institutional relations and the scope of judicial discretion in criminal
law. American lenity, as we know from the historical sources and
judicial applications, is a recognizably judge-made principle of
uncertain influence in the American constitutional and statutory
interpretative scheme. Judges invoke lenity unevenly when
approaching doubt-ridden legal texts to help guide or justify the
extent of their own adjudicative choice. American jurists who
champion lenity do so primarily out of nondelegation rationales. 277
Islamic lenity, as revealed from the historical and legal sources, is a
judge-made rule too. But Muslim jurists largely obscured that fact
once they deemed the lenity rule a text on par with other divine
legislation. To be sure, their decisions to apply the rule were guided
by the multiple legal schools' distinctive methodologies and a common
law-like notion of precedent within each. Moreover, they approached
criminal law decisions with similar motivations to those underlying
American structural views of lenity-a strong ideal of legislative
supremacy, particularly over criminal law. Yet, because they had
constructed a lenity doctrine that authorized them to expand the
scope of their own discretion at the same time that they claimed
fidelity to the texts and to legislative sovereignty concerns, Muslim
jurists were able to explicitly rely on both equitable and
nondelegation rationales to justify their decisions. The practical effect
is this: whereas American lenity has become a fraught and limited
tool ostensibly of judicial self-restraint, Islamic lenity emerged as a
relatively uncontroversial and expansive tool used to justify and
guide the exercise of judicial discretion in criminal law. In this way,
lenity jurisprudence-inasmuch as it exemplifies the operation of
legal canons in American and Islamic criminal law traditions-

277. In a separate project beyond the scope of the present study, a survey of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions suggests that the nondelegation view of American lenity
contends with other interpretations and disparate applications of the rule.
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reflects and helps explain important differences in the scope of
judicial discretion in these comparative public law contexts.

